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BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP ON TRIAL: ELK V. WILKINS
AND UNITED STATES V. WONG KIM ARK
Bethany R. Bergert
In the summer of 2015, the majority of Republican candidates for president
announced their opposition to birthright citizenship. The constitutional dimensions
of that right revolve around two cases decided at the end of the nineteenth century,
Elk v. Wilkins (1884) and United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898). The first held
that an American Indian man born in the United States was not a citizen under the
Fourteenth Amendment; the second, that a Chinese American man born in the
United States was indeed a citizen under the amendment. This Article juxtaposes the
history of these decisions. By showing the distinctive constitutional and political
status of Native peoples, this history underscores the unconstitutionality of efforts to
limit birthright citizenship and the consistency of Elk with the egalitarian ideals of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Further, by providing new facts about the litigants, lawyers, and communities
in these cases, this history provides new perspectives on the meaning of citizenship
and its role in judicial and administrative law. Although John Elk's non-Native
lawyers presented him as seeking to assimilate and abandon his tribe, Elk was part of
a Winnebago community and .likely sought only freedom from the federal
government's aggressive policies of land acquisition and domination. While Wong
Kim Ark's lawyers were products of an organized Chinese migrant community,
Wong also likely sought citizenship less as a quest for full assimilation than as an
effort to maintain his transnational family in the face of exclusionary immigration
policies. Wong's citizenship, however, permitted his Chinese-born son to migrate to
the United States, be drafted into the army in World War II, and make a career with
the Merchant Marines. The histories also show the limits of judicial action, as
Congress quickly undermined the effect of each opinion, and the divergent opinions
t Thomas F. Gallivan, Jr. Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law, B.A.
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both contributed to expanded administrative power. Together, these histories
challenge idealized concepts of citizenship, freedom, and individual action that
remain with us today, and provide a richer understanding of race, constitutional
doctrine, and administrative structure in the United States.
"The greatest hoax ever perpetrated upon [the Indian] was the [Indian] citizenship
[act] of 1924 .. .
-Luther Standing Bear, 19331
"We are American citizens in name but not in fact."
-Chinese American young adult, ca. 19312
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INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2015, birthright citizenship unexpectedly became
a key subject in the Republican presidential primary race. In August,
poll-leader Donald Trump, who had long been among the "birther"
zealots challenging President Obama's birthright citizenship,
announced that he would seek its demise.3 Retired neurosurgeon Ben
Carson, who would soon challenge Trump's popularity as a say-
anything outsider candidate, quickly agreed that birthright citizenship
didn't "make any sense" to him.4 Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal,
born to Indian immigrants four months after their arrival in the United
States, soon tweeted his opposition.5 Former Senator Rick Santorum
had actually published his opposition back in May, although no one
noticed until Trump joined in.6 Senators Lindsey Graham and Rand
Paul, meanwhile, noted that they had supported ending birthright
citizenship for years. 7 Senator Ted Cruz, the Canadian-born son of a
Cuban immigrant and a birthright citizen through his U.S. citizen
3 Editorial, G.O.P. Candidates Follow Trump to the Bottom on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/20/opinion/gop-candidates-follow-trump-to
-the-bottom-on-immigration.html.
4 Esther Yu-Hsi Lee, How Many Candidates Have 'Taken Advantage' of Birthright
Citizenship, But Oppose It?, THINKPROGRESS (Aug. 19, 2015, 1:44 PM), http://
thinkprogress.org/immigration/2015/08/19/3692969/birthright-citizenship-pres-candidates.
5 Id.
6 Rick Santorum, An Immigration Policy for Hard-Working Americans, BREITBART (May 6,
2015), http://www.breitbart.comlbig-government/2015/05/06/an-immigration-policy-for-hard-
working-americans.
7 Mark Murray, Where the GOP 2016 Candidates Stand on Birthright Citizenship, MSNBC
(Aug. 18, 2015, 3:39 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/where-the-gop-2016-candidates-
stand-birthright-citizenship.
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mother, s backed off his earlier position that birthright citizenship was
guaranteed by the Constitution, and declared he supported either
statutory or constitutional repeal.9 New Jersey Governor Chris Christie
also came out against birthright citizenship, but backtracked when he
figured out it was a constitutional right.10 Eventually only a few
Republican primary candidates refused to oppose automatic citizenship
for those born on U.S. soil.II
As Governor Christie discovered, birthright citizenship has been
part of the Constitution since the Fourteenth Amendment declared that
"[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside."12 The recurring movements to limit birthright
citizenship by statute, however, center around the ambiguous phrase
"subject to the jurisdiction thereof." The meaning of that phrase, in
turn, revolves around two Supreme Court cases decided at the end of
the nineteenth century, Elk v. Wilkins'3 and United States v. Wong Kim
Ark,14 the first rejecting citizenship for John Elk, a Winnebago man
born in Iowa to Wisconsin-born parents, the second upholding it for
Wong Kim Ark, a Chinese man born in California to Chinese-born
parents.
This Article is the first to juxtapose the histories of the two cases,
and the first to examine the history of Elk v. Wilkins in any detail. This
fuller picture underscores the flaws in constitutional arguments against
birthright citizenship, by highlighting the distinctive constitutional
status of Indian tribes. 15The drafters and supporters of the Fourteenth
Amendment both recognized this status, and recognized that protecting
it-and preventing automatic citizenship for tribal Indians-was
compelled by the egalitarian ideals of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Equally important, new facts about both men's lives suggest that
8 See Paul Clement & Neal Katyal, On the Meaning of "Natural Born Citizen", 128 HARV. L.
REV. FORUM 161, 163 (2015). See generally Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis
Citizenship and the Legal Construction of Family, Race, and Nation, 123 YALE L.J. 2134 (2014)
(discussing derivative citizenship).
9 Igor Bobic, Ted Cruz Once Said It Was a 'Mistake' to Try to End Birthright Citizenship,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 20, 2015, 12:31 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ted-cruz-
birthright-citizenship_55d5f798e4bab468daO 1952.
10 Catherine Thompson, Chris Christie Backtracks a Bit on Birthright Citizenship, TPM
LIVEWIRE (Aug. 20, 2015, 1:50 PM), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/livewire/chris-christie-
birthright-citizenship-take.
11 Murray, supra note 7.
12 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
13 Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 95 (1884).
14 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
15 This Article uses the terms American Indian, Indian, Native American, and Native
interchangeably to refer to the descendants of the people who were here before the arrival of
Europeans in North America.
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birthright citizenship, for them, was about preserving family and
community in the face of destroying governmental oppression. Finally,
this history shows the limits of judicial action and citizenship in the face
of this oppression, as Congress quickly undermined the effect of each
opinion, and the divergent opinions both contributed to expanded
administrative power.
Elk and Wong arose in a period in which citizenship and fitness for
it became key axes of federal subordination. This subordination took
place on several levels, and American Indians and Chinese were
paradigmatic examples of each.-First, exclusion from citizenship came to
mean geographic exclusion from the United States; Chinese were its first
federal targets; and Wong Kim Ark's case was a restraint on this
exclusion. Second, inclusion within citizenship, although it had always
meant subjection to the national government,16 became a central tool of
involuntary colonial domination, continuing on a political level the
geographic absorption of formerly autonomous territories.17 Although
policymakers had always tried to persuade Indians to accept citizenship
and assimilation, John Elk's suit was part of a new insistence that
American Indians could no longer choose to remain unassimilated
noncitizens. Third, lack of citizenship and unfitness for it increasingly
justified denying rights to those within the geographic community. At
the same time, a particular concept of citizenship became central to
American identity: that of the independent individual joining in the
great American melting pot. Those who did not meet this ideal were
denied both equality and governmental assistance to achieve it. 1s
Throughout the late nineteenth century, both Indians and Chinese
were condemned as falling short of the "self-reliant manhood"19 of the
16 Alleged birthright citizenship, for example, had been a source of prosecutions for treason
and piracy since the founding. See PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP
WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLIrY 52 (1985); see also Inglis v. Trs.
of Sailor's Snug Harbour, 28 U.S. 99, 121 (1830) (discussing citizenship of those born in
colonies); Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. 133 (1795) (rejecting defendants' efforts to renounce their
American citizenship).
17 See, e.g., Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of the Native
Americans: Redressing the Genocidal Act of Forcing American Citizenship Upon Indigenous
Peoples, 15 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 107 (1999). See generally WILL. KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL
CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 10-14 (1995) (discussing differing
claims of formerly autonomous groups absorbed within a territory and those who come to that
territory from the outside).
18 See HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, WEST FROM APPOMATTOX: THE RECONSTRUCTION OF
AMERICA AFTER THE CIVIL WAR (2007) (discussing the emerging role of new individualistic
citizenship ideal); see also LINDA K. KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES:
WOMEN AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP (1998) (discussing exclusion of women from
full citizenship); MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN AMERICA (2004) (discussing "alien citizenship" of racialized groups).
19 3 THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THE WINNING OF THE WEST 211 (New York, G.P. Putnam's
Sons 1894) (describing inherited traits of natural leaders of America).
2016] 1189
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citizenship ideal. Their ties to culture and community were thought to
root them in the past, making them unfit to be part of the "great nation
of futurity."20 Both were also considered unfree, Indians in "thraldom"
to their tribes,21 and Chinese "coolies" to Mandarin masters. 22 Although
policymakers claimed Indians were lazy and needed to be taught to
work and Chinese were too hard working, both were also considered
feminized by their relationship to work, Indian men by allowing women
to farm,23 and Chinese men by accepting labor-like laundry and
cooking-deemed fit for women, and eating rice rather than manly
meals of meat and potatoes.24 Therefore, although Wong Kim Ark's
citizenship was an important source of rights, he, like the anonymous
Chinese American quoted at the beginning of this Article, likely never
fully felt included in the United States; while John Elk's Winnebago
Tribe found that citizenship did not bring freedom from federal
authority but only increased federal coercion.
Chinese were usually described as permanently unassimilable and
Indians as needing coercion into assimilation, but in both cases the
result was to empower a growing federal bureaucracy. Both Indians and
Chinese, therefore, were early victims of the "contradictory ideology" of
activist government in the name of individualism and freedom.25 In the
name of freeing Indians from the shackles of tribalism, federal officials
governed the minutiae of reservation life, charting how many Indians
wore "citizen's dress" and how many acres they farmed,26 and removed
Indian children to boarding schools, circulating photographs showing
their transformation from savagery to civilization. In the name of
preserving American freedom, federal officials policed the nation's
borders, interrogating Chinese entrants, cataloging their distinguishing
marks, photographing them for future identification, and establishing
rights to interrogate, detain, and deport them once within U.S.
20 John L. O'Sullivan, The Great Nation of Futurity, 23 U.S. MAG. & DEMOCRATIC REV. 426
(1839).
21 Philip C. Garrett, Indian Citizenship, in AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS:
WRITINGS BY THE "FRIENDS OF THE INDIAN" 1880-1900, at 57, 60 (Francis Paul Prucha ed.,
1973) [hereinafter AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS].
22 See Moon-Ho Jung, Outlawing "Coolies": Race, Nation, and Empire in the Age of
Emancipation, 57 AM. Q. 677 (2005).
23 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE APP'x, 30th Cong., 2d Sess. 31, 32 (1848) (report of William
Medill, U.S. Comm'r of Indian Affairs) ("[A]nything like labor is distasteful, and utterly
repugnant [to Indian men and if] it be necessary to cultivate the earth, or to manufacture
materials for dress, it has to be done by the women .... ").
24 See, e.g., AM. FED'N OF LABOR, SOME REASONS FOR CHINESE EXCLUSION: MEAT VERSUS
RICE-AMERICAN MANHOOD AGAINST ASIATIC COOLIEISM-WHICH SHALL SURVIVE?, S. DOC.
NO. 57-137 (1902) [hereinafter REASONS FOR CHINESE EXCLUSION].
25 See RICHARDSON, supra note 18, at 6.
26 See, e.g., 1874 COMMISSIONER INDIAN AFF. ANN. REP. 108-31 (tables reflecting citizen
dress and acres and products farmed).
[Vol. 37:11851190
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borders.27 For both Indians and Chinese, formal citizenship was initially
believed to limit federal authority, but this limitation soon evaporated.28
Today, immigration and federal Indian law remain strange backwaters
in constitutional law, areas of executive and administrative supremacy
that contribute to U.S. dealings with foreign peoples in other contexts.2 9
John Elk and Wong Kim Ark's stories illuminate all of these
developments and helped to catalyze some of them.
Part I of this Article provides the background for the cases,
outlining the ways the Civil War and its aftermath transformed federal
citizenship and how a potential emancipatory moment for Indians and
Chinese instead laid the groundwork for future patterns of
subordination.
Part II focuses on the participants in the two cases and their
communities. This Part uses neglected aspects of the historical record to
consider for the first time the origins of Elk v. Wilkins and its meaning
for John Elk himself. The federal government had moved Elk's
Winnebago Tribe five times since his birth in pursuit of policies of
expansion and assimilation. When Elk brought suit, he was an illiterate
laborer living in a wigwam on the banks of the Mississippi, and likely
sought escape from federal domination rather than full assimilation.
While United States v. Wong Kim Ark has received far more attention,
including in excellent studies by two of the leading historians of
Chinese-American migration, 30 these histories have not noted a crucial
fact: Wong had married a woman and fathered a child in China four
years before his historic journey. When customs officers stopped him at
the U.S. border, he was returning from seeing his oldest child for the
first time and fathering a second. Working in America was necessary to
support his growing transnational family. Elk and Wong's struggles for
citizenship, these facts suggest, were less bids for individualistic change
of allegiance than efforts to maintain community and familial
connections in the face of federal attempts to destroy them. Although
these stories counter the ideal of the autonomous citizenship-seeker
represented in the mythology of the pioneer and the melting pot, they
27 See infra Section III.B.2.
28 Tiger v. W. Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286, 315 (1911); United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253
(1905).
29 See Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and
the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power Over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 12-14
(2002).
30 See Erika Lee, Birthright Citizenship, Immigration, and the U.S. Constitution: The Story of
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, in RACE LAW STORIES 89 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon W.
Carbado eds., 2008); Lee, Wong Kim Ark, supra note 2, at 65; Lucy E. Salyer, Wong Kim Ark-
The Contest Over Birthright Citizenship, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 51 (David A. Martin & Peter
H. Schuck eds., 2005) [hereinafter Salyer, Wong Kim Ark].
2016] 1191
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reflect the reality of migrants from the Pilgrims onward who became
Americans in part to preserve their original community ties.
Part II also examines the role of the lawyers in each case,
illuminating the complex relationship between citizenship suits and
community desires.31 At the time of Elk v. Wilkins, American Indians
had diminishing ability to intervene in policy as a group, either through
sovereign-to-sovereign diplomacy or by hiring their own attorneys. As a
result, Elk's case was undertaken by reformers committed to
assimilation and acculturation for Indians, who fit their clients' wishes
to their case rather than vice versa. 32 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, in
contrast, was one aspect of a coordinated, multifaceted, and remarkably
successful campaign by ethnic Chinese organized through huiguan,
mutual aid associations with roots in the migrants' districts of origin.33
Part III addresses the litigation, the ways Congress blunted the
impact of each ruling, and their aftermath for Elk, Wong, and their
communities. Elk inspired Congress to extend citizenship to Indians
receiving individual land under the disastrous 1887 Dawes Allotment
Act, and the need to prepare Indians for citizenship helped justify
federal boarding schools and subjection to American law.34 After Wong,
Congress amped up immigration laws to exclude all Asians, political
radicals, the disabled and poor, and others whose presence was deemed
inconsistent with American citizenship, and reduced the power to
challenge exclusion in federal court. 35 In the same year in 1924,
Congress closed the circle by declaring all Indians born in the United
States to be citizens, and placing quotas on all immigrants according to
their national origins and excluding all nonwhites from the quotas.36 For
both Indians and Chinese, community ties provided new strategies to
survive and challenge these measures.
Together, the histories of the two cases illuminate key aspects of
contemporary law and policy. They underscore the errors of arguments
that the cases support denying birthright citizenship to children of
illegal immigrants,37 and cast doubt on the use of Indian citizenship to
31 This examination complements work on the imperfect relationship between client desires
and lawyer action in scholarship on twentieth century desegregation lawsuits. See TOMIKO
BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 11-13 (2011); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals
and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
32 See infra Section II.A.2.
33 See infra Section II.B.2.
34 See infra Section III.A.2.
35 See infra Section III.B.2.
36 See infra Section III.B.2.
37 See SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 16, at 94-96; John C. Eastman, Commentary, Born in
the U.S.A.? Rethinking Birthright Citizenship in the Wake of 9/11, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 955, 961-
62 (2008). Rogers Smith now argues that his and Schuck's constitutional assessment was valid
[Vol. 37:11851192
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attack everything from tribal sovereign immunity to treaty fishing
rights.38 They shed light on our current immigration system, our
colonial traditions, and the expansive federal power that supports them,
and contribute to recent scholarship exposing the dark side of
citizenship.39 Finally, they present distinctly American stories, ones that
counter mythologies of assimilation and individualism, revealing
instead traditions of multinational communities enriching the mosaic
that is the United States.
I. BACKGROUND: INDIANS, CHINESE, AND FOREIGNNESS AS
SUBORDINATION
The Civil War and Reconstruction40 transformed the meaning of
citizenship in America. Previously, many of the most important aspects
of citizenship today-immigration,41 voting, provision of social
welfare,42 even naturalization43-were arenas of state and local rather
than federal regulation. Citizenship did carry important benefits,
particularly with regard to property ownership,44 but it was not yet a
in 1985, but that subsequent rejection of numerous efforts to limit birthright citizenship reflects
a new American constitutional consensus. See Rogers M. Smith, Birthright Citizenship and the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 and 2008, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1329 (2009) [hereinafter Smith,
Birthright Citizenship]. Smith notes that he and Schuck refuse to testify on behalf of these
efforts. Id. at 1332.
38 See infra notes 595-99 and accompanying text.
39 See LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY
MEMBERSHIP 1-4 (2006); ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF
CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 30 (1997) [hereinafter SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS]; Kunal M. Parker,
Citizenship and Immigration Law, 1800-1924: Resolutions of Membership and Territory, in 2
THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA: THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY (1789-
1920), at 168, 172-73 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008).
40 There are numerous definitions of the period of Reconstruction. Eric Foner, the leading
historian of the period, defines it as extending from the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863 to
1877, when the last federal troops left the South; others date its beginning to the end of the war
in 1865, or its start in 1861. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at xxv (Perennial Classics 2002) (1988). More recent scholarship
posits a much later end date. See RICHARDSON, supra note 18, at 4 (discussing the period from
the 1860s to 1900); Sam Erman, The Reconstruction Constitution in the Age of Empire 3 (2014)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing the period extending into the
second decade of the twentieth century). This Article does not embrace a particular
chronological definition, except in using the term "early Reconstruction" to refer to the 1860s.
41 See Kerry Abrams, The Hidden Dimension of Nineteenth-Century Immigration Law, 62
VAND. L. REV. 1353 (2009); Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law
(1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993).
42 Parker, supra note 39, at 173.
43 Polly J. Price, Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin's Case (1608), 9 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 73, 140 (1997) [hereinafter Price, Calvin's Case].
44 See Polly J. Price, Alien Land Restrictions in the American Common Law: Exploring the
Relative Autonomy Paradigm, 43 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 152, 159 (1999).
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significant source of either personhood or rights-voting rights were
often denied to citizens and extended to noncitizens,45 and the
relationship of citizenship to geographic exclusion was only beginning
to emerge. 46 Although African American citizenship was subject to
debate, 47 because slaves had been forcibly separated from their
nationalities of origin, foreignness itself was not central to their
domination.
This all changed over the latter part of the nineteenth century.
Reconstruction established citizenship as a matter of national definition
and regulation.48 Although American Indians and Chinese were tiny
fractions of the U.S. population-0.6% and 0.2% respectively in 188049-
they played an outsized role in these changes. The immediate postwar
period suggested new hope for the rights of both American Indians and
Chinese, but these possibilities quickly faded. Instead, each provided
models for foreignness as a source of domination, the first through
imperialism and the second through exclusion. At the same time,
Reconstruction left behind substantive and procedural legal tools that
made it possible for Elk and Wong to assert their own citizenship
claims.
A. The Fourteenth Amendment and Birthright Citizenship of Indians
and Chinese
Although noncitizenship was not central to antebellum
subordination, Dred Scott v. Sandford,50 holding that African Americans
45 CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 5177 (1870) (noting that eleven of thirty-seven states
permitted noncitizens to vote). Noncitizens continued to vote in a number of states until the
1920s. Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and
Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391, 1397-417 (1993).
46 Parker, supra note 39, at 172.
47 See SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS, supra note 39, at 176-78 (discussing debate in context of status
of new territories); see also State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 144, 24-25 (1838)
(holding that "all free persons born within the State are born citizens of the State," including
slaves born in North Carolina then manumitted); Amyv. Smith, 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 326, 334 (1822)
(holding that a slave born in the colonies could not become a citizen because she could not
exercise the rights and privileges of a citizen, such as voting).
48 Parker, supra note 39, at 169.
49 See U.S. CENSUS OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF THE TENTH CENSUS 4, 557 (1880) (U.S.
population 50,155,783, Chinese population 105,465); NANCY SHOEMAKER, AMERICAN INDIAN
POPULATION RECOVERY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 4 (paperbound prtg. 2000) (Indian
population 306,543). These proportions only shrank over the next decades. U.S. CENSUS
OFFICE, TWELFTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES, TAKEN IN THE YEAR 1900, PART 1:
POPULATION, at cxlvii, 492 (1901) [hereinafter 1900 CENSUS] (total population 76,212,168,
Indians 263,760, Chinese 119,050, or .35 and. 16% of pop ulation respectively).
50 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
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BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP ON TRIAL
could never be U.S. citizens,51 was a red flag to antislavery forces.52 In
1866, Congress overrode President Johnson's veto to enact birthright
citizenship as statutory law.53 Soon after, Congress proposed the
Fourteenth Amendment, enshrining national citizenship and jus soli as
constitutional law.54
American Indians and Chinese were central to a new discourse
linking race to foreign culture and allegiance in these debates.
Republican Senator Frelinghuysen of New Jersey, otherwise a supporter
of Reconstruction, declared himself "not in favor of giving the rights of
citizenship .. . to either pagans -or heathen .... I am not in- favor of
taking steps backward into the slough of ignorance and of vice, even
under the cry of progress."55 More sensationally, Democratic
Representative James Johnson of California warned that
[i]f the Hottentot, the cannibal from the jungles of Africa, the West
India negro, the wild Indian, and the Chinaman are to become a
ruling element in this country, then. .. convert your churches into
dens and brothels, wherein our young may receive fatal lessons to
end in rotting bones, decaying and putrid flesh, poisoned blood,
leprous bodies, and leprous souls. 56
With respect to Indians, however, the recurring theme was
insufficient progress toward civilization, while for Chinese it was
permanent inability to assimilate from an ancient but regressive
civilization. Objections to Indian citizenship focused on extending it to
"Indians in all stages," such as the "wild Indian of the plains" or the
"Digger Indians of California."57 Senator Henry Corbett of Oregon did
propose an amendment to prohibit naturalization of either Indians or
Chinese,s5 but in general, the question was not whether Indians should
become citizens-the Senate approved several treaties extending
51 Id. at 404-06.
52 See, e.g., GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, AMERICAN FOUNDING SON: JOHN BINGHAM AND THE
INVENTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 57-60, 69 (2013) [hereinafter MAGLIOCCA,
AMERICAN FOUNDING SON].
53 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
54 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, ci. I ("All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside."); Price, Calvin's Case, supra note 43, at 74.
55 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 979 (1869).
56 CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 756 (1870).
57 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2892 (1866) (statements of Sen. Doolittle); see also id.
at 2890, 2893, 2895 (statements of Sens. Doolittle, Fessenden, and Hendricks).
58 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 939 (1869).
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citizenship to tribal nations and Indian individuals between 1862 and
186859-but when and how.
While most congressmen had confidence in the ultimate
assimilation-or extinction-of Indians, many asserted that Chinese
could never partake of American identity.60 Senator Edgar Cowan of
Pennsylvania, for example, declared that if "th[e] door [is] thrown open
to the Asi[an] population[,] ... there [will be] an end to republican
government there, because.., those people have no appreciation of that
form of government; it seems to be obnoxious to their very nature."61
Even those like Senator Oliver Morton of Indiana, a strong supporter of
Negro suffrage, warned against extending suffrage to the Chinese, who
"belong to another civilization, one that can never unite or assimilate
with ours. They never can become American citizens in heart and
feeling."62 Although congressmen acknowledged the accomplishments
of Chinese civilization, these only added to the existential threat the
immigrants posed.63
These debates, however, made clear that Indians born in tribal
relations were not birthright citizens and that Chinese born in the
United States were. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 explicitly excluded
"Indians not taxed" along with those "subject to any foreign power"
from those who were citizens because they were born in the United
States.64 After a long debate, the Senate voted not to include the "Indians
not taxed" exception in the citizenship clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,65 but this was based on the belief that although tribal
Indians were "born in the United States," they were not "subject to the
jurisdiction thereof' in the sense in which the amendment used the
phrase.66 With respect to Chinese, however, there was universal
59 See, e.g., Treaty with the Sioux, Sioux-U.S., art. 6, Apr. 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635; Treaty with
the Delawares, Delawares-U.S., art. 9, July 4, 1866, 14 Stat. 793; Treaty with the Kickapoo,
Kickapoo-U.S., art. 3, June 28, 1862, 13 Stat. 623.
60 See John Hayakawa Torok, Reconstruction and Racial Nativism: Chinese Immigrants and
the Debates on the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and Civil Rights Laws, 3
ASIAN L.J. 55 (1996).
61 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 499 (1866).
62 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1034 (1869); see also id. at 939, 1034-38; Torok, supra
note 60, at 82-84.
63 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 287 (1869) (statement of Sen. Davis) ("There
is no nation out of Europe that has as high a civilization as the Chinese," but the "efficiency of
this race" only added to the threat should it "come in its deluge" to American shores).
64 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
65 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2897 (1866); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1,
cl. 1.
66 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2893 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull); id. at
2895 (Sen. Howard); id. at 2897 (Sen. Williams). This phrase excluded not only Indians, but
also those born to diplomatic representatives of other countries. Id. This consensus also
explains the decision to retain the exclusion of Indians not taxed in the apportionment clause
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agreement that with the Fourteenth Amendment, "the fundamental
instrument of the nation" established the citizenship of "children
begotten of Chinese parents in California."67 When Senator Cowan
asked whether the Fourteenth Amendment would "have the effect of
naturalizing the children of Chinese and Gypsies born in this country,"
Senator Trumbull answered, "Undoubtedly."68 No one countered this
consensus.
69
What explains the difference? Given the degree of anti-Chinese
sentiment, acceptance of birthright citizenship for ethnic Chinese partly
reflects belief that there would be few birthright citizens, as the first
wave of Chinese immigrants largely came without their wives and most
intended to return to China before their deaths.70 It also, however,
reflects acknowledgment that jus soli was a fundamental principle of
Reconstruction.71
Although some have described the lack of birthright citizenship for
tribal Indians as a mechanism of subjection,72 contemporary discussions
suggest that exclusion of tribal Indians from citizenship was also faithful
to the egalitarian principles of Reconstruction. There had been general
agreement that tribal Indians were not U.S. citizens since the 1787
Constitution declared that "Indians not taxed" should not be counted in
apportionment of congressional representatives.73 This exclusion from
citizenship reflected the autonomy of tribal nations. As Chancellor Kent
wrote in Goodell v. Jackson in 1823, Indians were not citizens because
they "are not our subjects.., born in obedience to us. They belong, by
when the Fourteenth Amendment revised it to remove the reference to three-fifths of unfree
persons. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2, cl. 2.
67 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2890-92 (1866) (statement of Sen. Conness).
68 Id. at 498 (statements of Sens. Cowan and Trumbull).
69 See Paul Finkelman, Original Intent and the Fourteenth Amendment: Into the Black Hole
of Constitutional Law, 89 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1019, 1024-25 (2014) (explaining that California
and Oregon senators were unhappy with birthright citizenship for Chinese but understood that
it was the Fourteenth Amendment's effect); Matthew Ing, Birthright Citizenship, Illegal Aliens,
and the Original Meaning of the Citizenship Clause, 45 AKRON L. REV. 719, 743-45, 746 &
n.136, 747 & n.140 (2012) (discussing public understanding that the Citizenship Clause
affirmed citizenship of all native-born individuals).
70 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2891 (1866) (statement of Sen. Conness)
(explaining why "their progeny in California is very small indeed").
71 However, it does help to explain California's failure to ratify the Fourteenth or Fifteenth
Amendments, and Oregon's attempt to revoke ratification. See HORACE EDGAR FLACK, THE
ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 207 (1908) (noting that California took no vote
on the Fourteenth Amendment because it would have been deadlocked); Cheryl A. Brooks,
Comment, Race, Politics, and Denial: Why Oregon Forgot to Ratify the Fourteenth Amendment,
83 OR. L. REV. 731, 741-42 (2004) (arguing revocation attempt reflected racism against blacks,
Indians, and Chinese).
72 See, e.g., SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 16, at 63-66.
73 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 14.01(2)
(Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN'S].
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birth, to their own tribes, and these tribes are placed under our
protection and dependent upon us; but still we recognize them as
national communities."74 Citizenship would "annihilate the political
existence of the Indians as nations and tribes" and could not justly be
extended without the "full knowledge and assent of the Indians
themselves."75
Although the executive branch had generally embraced plans to
"annihilate the political existence of the Indians as nations and tribes"
by the 1860s,76 for many abolitionists and radical Republicans, abuses of
tribal sovereign rights were linked to abuses of African American
individual rights.77 The insistence that Indians in tribal relations should
not involuntarily become citizens came exclusively from Republicans,
and was championed most fervently by the stalwarts of early
Reconstruction egalitarianism.
As early as 1862, Representative John Bingham, who is credited
with drafting the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment,
passionately argued for extending citizenship to "every human being, no
matter what his complexion,"78 but asserted that Indians were the only
exception to this rule, because tribes had been "recognized at the
organization of this Government as independent sovereignties."79
Similarly, in arguing that the citizenship clause did not include Indians
born in tribal relations, Senate Republican leader Lyman Trumbull
argued that it would "be a breach of good faith on our part to extend the
laws of the United States over the Indian tribes with whom we have
these treaty stipulations."80
74 See Goodell v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 693, 712 (N.Y. 1823).
75 Id. at 717. Similarly, Justice Taney in Dred Scott asserted that Indian nations "were
regarded and treated as foreign Governments, as much so as if an ocean had separated the red
man from the white," and Indians might become citizens "like the subjects of any other foreign
Government." Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404 (1857). Nevertheless, Taney
insisted, Indians were not "aliens being free white persons" able to naturalize under the 1790
act. Id. at 419-20 (quoting Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103). For discussions of
Taney's position regarding Indians in Dred Scott, see Frederick E. Hoxie, What Was Taney
Thinking? American Indian Citizenship in the Era of Dred Scott, 82 CHI-KENT L. REV. 329
(2007), and Bethany R. Berger, "Power Over this Unfortunate Race"- Race, Politics and Indian
Law in United States v. Rogers, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1957, 2004-08 (2004) [hereinafter
Berger, "Power Over this Unfortunate Race"].
76 Goodell, 20 Johns. at 712; see Berger, "Power Over this Unfortunate Race", supra note 75,
at 2016-18 (discussing executive branch policy and battles with Congress).
77 See GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE RISE AND
FALL OF GENERATIONAL REGIMES 88-93, 118-23 (2007); Bethany R. Berger, Reconciling Equal
Protection and Federal Indian Law, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1165, 1172-73 (2010); Linda K. Kerber, The
Abolitionist Perception of the Indian, 62 J. AM. HIST. 271, 279 (1975).
78 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1640 (1862).
79 Id. at 1639. See generally MAGLIOCCA, AMERICAN FOUNDING SON, supra note 52
(discussing Bingham's role in Fourteenth Amendment and Civil Rights Act).
80 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2894 (1866).
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Those arguing to add an "Indians not taxed" exception to the
Citizenship Clause, in contrast, insisted that Indians were fully subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States because Indians had "no
sovereign power whatever," and the United States could do with them
"just what it thought proper."s1 This argument lost in an almost entirely
party-line vote. 82 Two years later, the Senate Judiciary Committee
rejected the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment had made Indians
citizens with whom the United States could not enter a treaty.83 The
committee insisted that tribes retained their "character as a nation or
political community," and that to 'treat the.-,, tribe[s] as subject-to the
municipal jurisdiction of the United States" in the sense intended by the
Fourteenth Amendment, "would be unconstitutional and void."84 The
consistent refrain of the strongest advocates of egalitarian
Reconstruction was that excluding tribal Indians from birthright
citizenship was necessary to recognize their remaining national
autonomy and freedom from subjection.
B. Reconstruction's Lost Promise for American Indians
Discussions of tribal autonomy in the citizenship debates were
partly constitutional rhetoric, and indeed, respect for tribal sovereignty
was already fast passing away.8 5 But other aspects of the immediate
postwar years also suggested a "potential recasting of the relationship
between Indian people and the United States."86 Ultimately this
potential failed, in part because of the other effects of the war and
Reconstruction.
During the Civil War, local volunteers replaced soldiers in western
states.87 Motivated by desire for Indian land and vengeance for local
conflicts, these volunteers committed abuses that generated a "great
humanitarian outcry" against federal Indian policy.88 In 1867, a
committee appointed by Congress to investigate the treatment of Indian
81 Id. at 506 (statement of Sen. Johnson).
82 Id. at 2897.
83 COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, EFFECT OF FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT UPON INDIAN TRIBES,
S. REP. No. 41-268 (1870).
84 Id. at 3, 9.
85 See Hoxie, supra note 75.
86 C. JOSEPH GENETIN-PILAWA, CROOKED PATHS TO ALLOTMENT: THE FIGHT OVER
FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 3 (2012).
87 ROBERT M. UTLEY, THE INDIAN FRONTIER 1846-1890, at 71 (rev. ed. 2003).
88 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND
THE AMERICAN INDIANS 480 (1984) [hereinafter PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER]; see also
COHEN'S, supra note 73, § 1.03(7). The 1864 Sand Creek Massacre is emblematic: Colorado
Volunteers annihilated hundreds of peaceful Cheyenne who had gone to Sand Creek to seek
protection from soldiers attacking Indians indiscriminately. Id.
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tribes leveled myriad charges of fraud and corruption against civilian
and military forces and blamed Indian wars largely on "the aggressions
of lawless white men."89 In 1868, a new Indian Peace Commission
denounced the violation of tribal treaty and property rights, declaring
that the United States had been "uniformly unjust."90 The commission
set out to negotiate new treaties with the Indian tribes, resulting in more
than a dozen treaties between 1865 and 1868.91 In 1869, President
Ulysses Grant appointed his friend and former military secretary Ely
Parker, a Seneca sachem, as the first Native American Commissioner of
Indian Affairs.92
But in other ways the war and its aftermath undermined respect for
tribal territory and autonomy. In part, this was ideological. Emphasis on
integration and education for former slaves contributed to a similar
emphasis on Indian assimilation instead of sovereignty.93 More
importantly, the war transformed the territorial reality and imagination
of the United States. Freed from conflict over the slave or free status of
new territories and eager to exploit new land to support the war effort,
Congress enacted the Homestead Act in 1862 encouraging Americans
(and foreigners who had filed declarations of intent to become citizens)
to settle and claim the west.94 Wartime industrial expansion and
investment by the Reconstruction Congress resulted in the completion
of the transcontinental railroad in 1869,95 the final blow to the notion
that any part of the country could remain free from white settlement.
Between 1850 and 1912, moreover, seventeen western territories became
states, making the west with its large Native communities both a
powerful national symbol and an important voting bloc.96
Railroad interests lobbied for new lines across Indian Territory,
while settlers demanded new lands.97 To placate expansionists, the Peace
Commission failed to reserve territories on which the tribal negotiators
insisted and the executive failed to restrain settlers or to provide
promised annuities to compensate for lost hunting grounds.9s These
89 JOINT SPECIAL COMM. OF THE Two HOUSES OF CONG., CONDITION OF THE INDIAN
TRIBES, S. REP. NO. 39-156, at 5 (1867).
90 INDIAN PEACE COMM'N, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (1868); see also PRUCHA, THE GREAT
FATHER, supra note 88, at 491 (quoting report).
91 See COHEN'S, supra note 73, § 1.03(8).
92 WILLIAM H. ARMSTRONG, WARRIOR IN Two CAMPS: ELY S. PARKER, UNION GENERAL
AND SENECA CHIEF 135-36 (1990).
93 See Kerber, supra note 77, at 288-89.
94 Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392; FONER, supra note 40, at 21; RICHARDSON,
supra note 18, at 25.
95 FONER, supra note 40, at 21.
96 See RICHARDSON, supra note 18, at 4.
97 See COLIN G. CALLOWAY, PEN & INK WITCHCRAFT: TREATIES AND TREATY MAKING IN
AMERICAN INDIAN HISTORY 180, 186 (2013).
98 Id. at 213-14.
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treaties also embraced the use of reservations as crucibles of
assimilation.99 Unsurprisingly, therefore, the peace treaties did not
produce peace. 100 This failure, combined with resentment by the House
of Representatives at its inability to vote on treaties that transferred land
to railroads, led Congress to end treaty making with Indian tribes in
1871.101
Citizenship was part of this campaign for expansion and
assimilation. Beginning in 1874, Congress repeatedly debated a bill that
would allow individual Indians to become citizens if they proved they
had "adopted the habits of civilized life.'102 Supporters argued- that it
was no longer possible to protect tribal lands from settlers and that
assimilation was inevitable.103 (Suggesting an ulterior motive, the bill's
primary advocate was Senator Ingalls of Kansas,104 a state which sought
to declare resident Indians citizens subject to state taxation.)105 These
bills stumbled on concerns that citizenship had often been disastrous for
the Indians to which it had been extended, 106 and that permitting
Indians to become citizens and yet retain rights to tribal property
violated treaty obligations. 107
Inspired in part by Standing Bear v. Crook (a case litigated by John
Elk's lawyers), however, eastern reformers who had once championed
abolition seized on Indian citizenship and assimilation as their new
humanitarian cause. 108 Elk v. Wilkins, a defeat for this campaign,
ultimately helped catalyze its later legislative triumphs.
99 Id. at 182.
100 See id. at 220.
101 Act of March 8, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2012)); see
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 3261-64 (1868).
102 See SEC'Y OF THE INTERIOR, LETTER TRANSMITTING DRAFT OF BILL To ENABLE INDIANS
TO BECOME CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. EXEC. DOc. No. 43-228 (1874).
103 See 6 CONG. REC. 551 (1877) (statement of Sen. Ingalls); 6 CONG. REC. 525-26 (1877)
(statement of Sen. Thurman). Ely Parker made similar arguments in 1869, declaring
citizenship, assimilation, and the end of treaty making were the only just future for Indians.
ANN. REP. COMMISSIONER INDIAN AFF., H. EXEC. DOc. NO. 41-1 (1869).
104 6 CONG. REC. 554 (1877) (statement of Sen. Ingalls) (noting that he had introduced the
same bill every year he had been in Congress).
105 See In re Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866) (rejecting attempt).
106 See 7 CONG. REC. 1130-31 (1878) (statement of Sen. Whyte).
107 6 CONG. REC. 551-53 (1877) (statements by Sens. Hoar, Thurman, and Maxey). Although
Congress did not pass the general bill, it did enact several similar measures with respect to
particular tribes. Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 332, 17 Stat. 631 (Miami Indians); Act of July 15, 1870,
ch. 296, § 9, 16 Stat. 335, 361-62 (Winnebago Indians in Minnesota); Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch.
127, § 4, 13 Stat. 541, 562 (Stockbridge Indians).
108 See infra Section II.A.
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C. Reconstruction's Lost Promise for Chinese in America
Although congressmen on both sides of the aisle expressed virulent
anti-Chinese sentiment, early Reconstruction also presented potential
for a more egalitarian reception of Chinese in the United States.109 Most
notable is the Burlingame Treaty of 1868. Moved by the economic
advantages of Chinese immigration and commerce,"10 the Chinese
negotiating delegation was feted on a tour of the United States, and
received a respectful, almost obsequious reception in Congress."'
The resulting treaty "cordially recognize[d] the inherent and
inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance, and also the
mutual advantage of the free migration and emigration of their citizens
and subjects," including as "permanent residents."112 It guaranteed
Chinese in the United States "the same privileges, immunities, [and]
exemptions in respect to travel or residence as may there be enjoyed by
the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation."113 These provisions
seemed to repudiate discriminatory and exclusionary laws many
western states had enacted.114 Two years later, Congress implemented
these provisions in the 1870 Civil Rights Act, guaranteeing "all persons"
equal rights to give evidence and equal taxation of emigrants "from any
other foreign country,"15 thus invalidating state bans on Chinese
testimony116 and taxes on Chinese miners.117
But even these early years reflect strong opposition to Chinese
citizenship. The Senate inserted a provision in the Burlingame Treaty
that "nothing herein contained shall be held to confer naturalization
upon citizens of the United States in China, nor upon the subjects of
China in the United States."118 And in 1870, the Senate initially voted in
favor of Charles Sumner's proposal to remove the word "white" from
the requirements for naturalization, but reversed in the face of anti-
109 Charles J. McClain, Jr., The Chinese Struggle for Civil Rights in Nineteenth Century
America: The First Phase, 1850-1870, 72 CAL. L. REV. 529, 540-42, 564-68 (1984) [hereinafter
McClain, Chinese Struggle] (discussing advocacy strategy).
110 Id. at 545-46.
111 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2970 (1868) (statement by H. Speaker
Colfax) ("[Wle turn our faces from the fatherland of Europe to clasp hands in closer relations
than ever before with those who come to us from that continent which was the birthplace of
mankind.").
112 Burlingame Treaty, China-U.S., art. 5, July 28, 1868, 16 Stat. 739, 740.
113 Id. art. 6.
114 McClain, Chinese Struggle, supra note 109, at 562-63.
115 Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 140, 144.
116 People v. Washington, 36 Cal. 658 (1869), overruled by People v. Brady, 40 Cal. 198
(1870).
117 McClain, Chinese Struggle, supra note 109, at 563-66.
118 Burlingame Treaty, China-U.S., art. 6, July 28,1868, 16 Stat. 739, 740.
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Chinese sentiment, opening naturalization only to those of African
descent.119
Industrialization had mixed effects for Chinese immigrants. While
it stimulated demand by business interests for Chinese workers, it also
gave rise to a new worker class seeking scapegoats for their powerless
condition.120 A series of national depressions between the 1870s and
1890s fueled anti-Chinese nativism.12, The growing power of the
western vote, moreover, was as fatal for Chinese migrants as it was for
Indians.
As with Indians; policymakers used the ideals of Reconstruction- to
warrant subordination of Chinese. Abhorrence of slavery served to
justify what some call the first federal law restricting immigration, an
1862 statute prohibiting Americans from participating in the "coolie
trade" importing conscripted Chinese laborers to foreign countries.122
Although the statute exempted voluntary migrants and did not reach
migration into the United States alone, the idea that Chinese were slave
laborers inconsistent with American ideals helped justify America's first
exclusionary laws. 123 In 1875, Congress enacted the Page Act, restricting
and criminalizing importation of individuals from "China, Japan, or any
Oriental country" who were not "free and voluntary" emigrants or were
party to any contract for "lewd [or] immoral purposes," and prohibited
immigration by convicted criminals and by all women "for the purposes
of prostitution."124 Although Chinese merchants in America had lobbied
for more restrictions on prostitution and fully supported the Page
Act,125 policymakers deployed the same logic to prohibit migration of
Chinese laborers in the Exclusion Act of 1882,126 describing Chinese as a
119 CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 5177 (1870); see also Naturalization Act of 1870, ch.
254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254, 256.
120 See Aziz RANA, THE Two FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 189 (2010).
121 JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM 1860-1925,
at 18, 46, 73-74 (1955); see also FONER, supra note 40, at 512-22.
122 Coolie Trade Prohibition Act, ch. 27, 12 Stat. 340 (1862); CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d
Sess. 350-52 (1862) (discussing goals of act).
123 Jung, supra note 22 (arguing act was origin of later prohibitions).
124 Page Act, ch. 141, §§ 1, 3, 18 Stat. 477 (1875). While some scholars argue that the law was
responsible for the exclusion of most Chinese women other than merchants' wives, see Leti
Volpp, Divesting Citizenship: On Asian American History and the Loss of Citizenship Through
Marriage, 53 UCLA L. REV. 405, 465 & n.282 (2005), others disagree, see Adam McKeown,
Transnational Chinese Families and Chinese Exclusion, 1875-1943, J. AM. ETHNIC HIST., Winter
1999, at 73, 80.
125 YUCHENG QIN, THE DIPLOMACY OF NATIONALISM: THE SIX COMPANIES AND CHINA'S
POLICY TOWARD EXCLUSION 52-53, 83 (2009).
126 Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58.
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"servile people" who were "held... in the country in a bondage" and
were "incapable of free or self-government."127
The end of slavery, by removing disputes about migration of freed
and enslaved blacks, also freed the Supreme Court to assert
congressional supremacy over immigration.128 It did so in the 1870s
with decisions invalidating restrictive California,129 New York, and
Louisiana laws.130 Although ostensibly limiting state power, the
decisions resulted in translation of concerns of a handful of states into
federal demands.131 While the states had been limited to indirect
measures such as bonds on passengers and ships,132 the federal
government could exclude migrants entirely. In the age of federal
immigration supremacy, the limited attempts by individual states to
restrict immigration within their own borders became broad
prohibitions with the full enforcement power and territorial reach of the
federal government behind them.
D. Conclusion
Reconstruction created a new sense of national territory and
citizenship as well as a newly empowered national government.
Together, these helped doom separate sovereignty for Indians and
egalitarian migration for Chinese. But Reconstruction also left these
groups with new legal tools to counter their subordination. Although
the Supreme Court drained much of the force from the Fourteenth
Amendment's privileges and immunities of national citizenship, 133
litigation by Chinese established that the guarantee of equal protection
to "any person" within state jurisdiction covered foreigners as well as
citizens.134 Equally important for Elk and Wong, in 1867, Congress had
broadened the scope of habeas corpus jurisdiction to give the courts
power to grant writs where "any person may be restrained of his or her
127 13 CONG. REC. 1484, 1486 (1882) (statement of Sen. Miller); see also ERIKA LEE, AT
AMERICA'S GATES: CHINESE IMMIGRATION DURING THE EXCLUSION ERA, 1882-1943, at 26-27
(2003) [hereinafter LEE, AMERICA'S GATES]; Volpp, supra note 124, at 462-63.
128 Parker, supra note 39, at 176.
129 Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 278-81 (1875).
130 Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 275 (1875).
131 Hidetaka Hirota, The Moment of Transition: State Officials, the Federal Government, and
the Formation of American Immigration Policy, 99 J. AM. HIST. 1092, 1096-98 (2013).
132 See Smith v. Turner (The Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849) (invalidating
state laws that directly taxed immigrants upon arrival).
133 See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874) (holding that voting was not one
of the privileges and immunities of citizenship and limiting voting rights to men did not violate
Fourteenth Amendment); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77 (1872) (stating the
privileges and immunities of U.S. citizens included "very few express limitations").
134 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
1204 [Vol. 37:1185
BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP ON TRIAL
liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the
United States,"135 while in 1875, Congress finally granted the lower
courts original federal question jurisdiction,136 removing what had been
an important obstacle to tribal litigation. 137 Both Indians and Chinese
would use these legal tools to preserve some legal recognition of tribal
and immigrant rights, even as both were overwhelmed in the name of
the American national destiny.
II. LITIGANTS, LAWYERS, AND COMMUNITIES
This Part examines the meanings of Elk v. Wilkins and United
States v. Wong Kim Ark for the litigants' communities, their lawyers,
and Elk and Wong themselves. This examination reveals the ambiguities
of citizenship for both American Indians and Chinese, the very different
relationship of Elk's and Wong's lawyers to their clients and the
American Indian and Chinese communities, and finally the unexplored
facts of each man's life that show that although both likely sought
citizenship to adapt and change in the face of crushing circumstances,
neither appears to have done so as the autonomous individual of the
citizenship ideal.
A. Elk v. Wilkins
1. The Significance of Citizenship for American Indians
For policymakers in the nineteenth century, citizenship meant
assimilation and the end of tribal status. Laws and treaties extended
citizenship as a reward for renouncing allegiance to the tribe and
adopting the "habits of civilized life."138 Anglo-American clothing was
called "citizen's dress," and the Indian Office kept censuses of how
many reservation Indians wore it. 139 Citizenship, many believed, ended
tribal immunity from state law and taxation as well as federal
obligations of support and protection. Citizenship was not primarily a
135 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
136 Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470.
137 See Joseph William Singer, Nine-Tenths of the Law: Title, Possession & Sacred
Obligations, 38 CONN. L. REV. 605, 618-19 (2006).
138 Treaty with the Delawares, Delawares-U.S., art. 9, July 4, 1866, 14 Stat. 793, 796; Treaty
with the Kickapoo, Kickapoo-U.S., art. 3, June 28, 1862, 13 Stat. 623; Treaty with the
Potawatomi, Potawatomi-U.S., art. 3, Nov. 15, 1861, 12 Stat. 1191.
139 See, e.g., 1874 COMMISSIONER INDIAN AFF. ANN. REP. 112 (reporting 43,953 Indians
wearing citizen's dress).
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boon extended to Indians. 140 Rather, it was the end point of federal plans
to end the "Indian problem" by ending Indian tribes.141
How did Indians feel about these measures? Some individual
Indians did seek citizenship. As tribal territories became smaller and
poorer and federal efforts to acculturate Native people grew more
intense, more Indians left their reservations to enter non-Indian society.
While they often experienced prejudice as nonwhites in Jim Crow
America, in many settings these legal and social barriers were less
extreme than those experienced by African Americans. But their lack of
citizenship often meant they could not participate in the civil and
political rights reserved for citizens.
Perhaps the most famous Indian citizenship-seeker of the period
was Ely Parker. Parker studied law, but was denied the right to sit for the
New York State Bar Exam because he was not a citizen.142 He then
became a successful civil engineer, and headed major public works
projects.43 He also became a leader in the (largely ceremonial) New
York militia144 and the Masons.145 Despite this, the United States
initially rebuffed his attempts to enlist in the Civil War, telling him that
this was "an affair between white men," which they could settle "without
any Indian aid." 146 Stung at the rejection, Parker petitioned Congress to
admit him to citizenship, proclaiming himself a "freeholder, paying
taxes in the states of New York, Iowa and Minnesota" who had held
"positions of trust and honor in the state and federal [government]" and
had "a high veneration for the laws and institutions of this, his native
country."147 Congress rejected the petition, stating that it could not
grant individual petitions for citizenship.148 Finally, on a friend's
recommendation, Parker received a commission as an assistant adjutant
general with the rank of Captain.149 He was ultimately promoted to
Brigadier General, and, as military secretary for Ulysses S. Grant, wrote
out the terms of Confederate surrender at Appomattox. 150 After the war,
140 See Kevin Bruyneel, Challenging American Boundaries: Indigenous People and the "Gift"
of U.S. Citizenship, 18 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 30 (2004).
141 See Hoxie, supra note 75, at 342 (arguing Indian citizenship campaigns "employed the
language of Indian competence to justify the dismantling of tribal governments and the
acquisition of tribal lands").
142 ARTHUR C. PARKER, THE LIFE OF GENERAL ELY S. PARKER: LAST GRAND SACHEM OF THE
IROQUOIS AND GENERAL GRANT'S MILITARY SECRETARY 79 (1919) [hereinafter PARKER, LIFE OF
GENERAL PARKER].
143 Id. at 90-98.
144 ARMSTRONG, supra note 92, at 55-56.
145 PARKER, LIFE OF GENERAL PARKER, supra note 142, at 96-98.
146 Id. at 102-03 (quoting Gen. Ely Parker).
147 ARMSTRONG, supra note 92, at 78.
148 H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. NO. 37-84 (1862).
149 ARMSTRONG, supra note 92, at 82.
150 PARKER, LIFE OF GENERAL PARKER, supra note 142, at 131-32, 142-43.
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he received citizenship for his service,15l married one of the belles of
white Washington society, and later became the first indigenous
Commissioner of Indian Affairs.
Parker's story illustrates the barriers that racism, lack of
citizenship, and tribal status, posed to Indian people. But it also
illustrates that for Indians with "a high veneration"152 for United States
laws and institutions, doors were open that were often closed to people
of color. The next generation of Indian intellectuals would even claim
that Americans did not harbor racial prejudice against American
Indians.153 Although many Indians- could testify to the falsehood -of this
generalization, it also captured something of the distinctive status of
Native people in the United States. Parker delighted in recounting that
when General Robert E. Lee saw him at Appomattox, he flushed
indignantly thinking Parker was a black man, but when he realized
Parker was Indian he shook his hand saying he was glad to see a "real
American" there.154 Booker T. Washington recalled how, in the 1880s,
he was placed in charge of the Indians brought to the Hampton
University for African Americans for a training program founded in the
inferiority of Native culture,5- but that when he took one of his young
charges to Washington, D.C., to get a federal certificate permitting his
return to his western reservation, the Indian ward was admitted to
dining rooms and hotels from which his African-American guardian
was excluded.156
Few reservation Indians achieved Parker's status in white society.
But some saw citizenship as the remedy for the problems facing
ordinary Indians as well. Federal agents had assumed vast control over
Indian lives by this time, managing tribal funds and lands, appointing
and deposing tribal chiefs, judges, and police, and doling out food and
clothing to Indians prohibited from using their former lands for
sustenance. 5 7 Like John Elk's Winnebago Tribe, moreover, the United
States removed many tribes from their lands not once, but again and
again, as non-Indians expanded into previously remote lands.I58
A new group of reformers calling themselves the "Friends of the
Indian" promoted citizenship and allotment of land as the alternative to
151 Id. at 141.
152 ARMSTRONG, supra note 92, at 78.
153 LUCY MADDOX, CITIZEN INDIANS: NATIVE AMERICAN INTELLECTUALS, RACE & REFORM
65-67 (2005).
154 PARKER, LIFE OF GENERAL PARKER, supra note 142, at 133 (quoting Ely Parker). Parker
allegedly responded that "[w]e are all Americans." Id. (quoting Ely Parker).
155 See Kerber, supra note 77, at 292.
156 BOOKER T. WASHINGTON, UP FROM SLAVERY: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, ch. VI (1901).
157 See Berger, "Power Over this Unfortunate Race", supra note 75, at 1972-73, 2009.
158 Id.
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this federal domination. Some Indians joined this campaign. Susette La
Flesche was one of these. Her Omaha Tribe neighbored the Winnebago
Reservation, and she was likely involved in John Elk's case. La Flesche
became involved in the reform movement in 1879, when she testified on
behalf of the Ponca in Standing Bear v. Crook.159 Standing Bear's lawyers
became Elk's lawyers, and she was almost certainly in touch with them,
and perhaps him, about the case. On March 10, 1880, a month before
Elk filed his petition, La Flesche published an essay claiming
[i]t is either extermination or citizenship for the Indian.... Set aside
the idea that the Indian is a child and must be taken care of,... give
him a title to his lands, throw over him the protection of the law,
make him amenable to it, and the Indian will take care of himself." 160
Like Ely Parker, La Flesche was a member of the western-educated
elite. Her father Joseph La Flesche came from a Ponca/French fur
trading family but had been adopted by and succeeded the Chief of the
Omahas; her mother was the daughter of a white army doctor and an
Omaha woman. 161 The La Flesche children attended mission schools
and later eastern colleges; her sister Susanne became the first licensed
Native American woman doctor; her brother Francis became the first
professional Native American ethnologist. 162
Due the advocacy of the La Flesches and white ethnologist Alice
Fletcher, the Omahas were early experiments in allotment and
citizenship.163 Omaha land was allotted in 1884, and the Omahas
became citizens in 1887.164 The results were such a disaster that by
December 1887, 158 Omahas had signed a petition to Congress asking
for their citizenship to be revoked and their tribal status returned.16
One man pleaded, "I want you to help us keep this thing citizenship,
away from us." 166 The petitioners claimed that Alice Fletcher had misled
them; they had been forced to become citizens and wished to return to
their old status. 167 One wrote that Fletcher had told them that they
would not be citizens or pay taxes for twenty-five years, but now, only
159 United States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. 695 (C.C.D. Neb. 1879);
AMERICAN INDIAN NONFICTION: AN ANTHOLOGY OF WRITINGS, 1760s-1930S, at 285-86
(Bernd C. Peyer ed., 2007) [hereinafter AMERICAN INDIAN NONFICTION].
160 Susette La Flesche, The Indian Question, CHRISTIAN UNION, Mar. 10, 1880, at 222,
reprinted in AMERICAN INDIAN NONFICTION, supra note 159, at 284, 285.
161 AMERICAN INDIAN NONFICTION, supra note 159, at 286.
162 Id.
163 JUDITH A. BOUGHTER, BETRAYING THE OMAHA NATION: 1790-1916, at 109-13 (1998).
164 Id. at 112-13.
165 WA HANE GA ET AL., PETITION OF MEMBERS OF THE OMAHA TRIBE OF INDIANS IN
REGARD TO CITIZENSHIP AND TAXATION, S. MISC. DOC. 50-26 (1888).
166 Id. at 2 (statement of Pa-hang-ga-ma-ne).
167 Id. at 1 (statement of Hopera).
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three years later, they had become citizens. 168 "If there is a chance at all,"
he asked, "we want a little of our Indian ways for twenty-five years."69
Although statements of those like La Flesche and Parker received
widest dissemination, those of the Omaha petition seem more typical.
After being made citizens under an 1843 statute, most Stockbridge
Indians refused to accept it; they later persuaded Congress to revoke the
legislation and enter into a treaty restoring their status as a tribe.170 The
Wyandotte, who had entered into an 1855 treaty accepting citizenship
and dissolving the tribe, found its impact so damaging that they
successfully petitioned for an 1867 treaty in which they "beg[a]n anew a
tribal existence. " 171 One of the three bands of Kickapoo Indians were so
resistant to an 1862 treaty trying to allot them lands and make them
citizens that they refused to accept citizenship until 1985.172 Kansas
Indians, who were allegedly made citizens to please the railroads, sought
to have their tribal status restored.173 In 1874, former Commissioner of
Indian Affairs Francis Walker reported that of the tribes to whom
citizenship had been extended, "more than half, probably at least two-
thirds, are now homeless, and must be re-endowed by the government,
or they will sink to a condition of hopeless poverty and misery." 174
Tribal leaders were also concerned about citizenship. In 1831,
when the Cherokee Nation sued Georgia in the U.S. Supreme Court, the
tribal nation's attorneys "insisted that individually they are aliens, not
owing allegiance to the United States."175 In response to the citizenship
bills of the 1870s, the Seminole, Creek, Choctaw, and Chickasaw
Nations petitioned Congress arguing that the bill violated solemn
treaties guaranteeing the tribes property and self-government.176 The
Friends of the Indian dismissed such protests as a desire to maintain the
"tribal thraldom" upon which the chiefs' "importance depends."177
168 Id. at 2 (statement of Wa-ha-na-zhe).
169 Id. at 3.
170 Treaty with the Stockbridge Tribe, Stockbridge-U.S., Nov. 24, 1848, 9 Stat. 955.
171 See Treaty with the Seneca, Mixed Seneca and Shawnee, Quapaw, Etc. pmbl. & art. 13,
Feb. 23, 1867, 15 Stat. 513.
172 143 Renegade Kickapoos Accept U.S. Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 1985), http:f
www.nytimes.com/1985/11/22/us/around-the-nation- 143-renegade-kickapoos-accept-us-
citizenship.html.
173 SEMINOLE & CREEK DELEGATES, REMONSTRANCE AGAINST THE PASSAGE OF SENATE BILL
NO. 107, TO ENABLE INDIANS TO BECOME CITIZENS, S. MISC. DOC. No. 45-8, at 3 (1878)
[hereinafter SEMINOLE & CREEK REMONSTRANCE]. The "Indians in Kansas" are probably the
Kansas Indians or Kansas Delawares, who generations later were still suing about their lack of
federal recognition. See Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 77-78 (1977).
174 FRANCIS A. WALKER, THE INDIAN QUESTION 141 (1874).
175 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831).
176 SEMINOLE & CREEK REMONSTRANCE, supra note 173, at 1-2; CHOCTAW & CHICKASAW
NATIONS OF INDIANS, MEMORIAL REMONSTRATING AGAINST THE PASSAGE OF SENATE BILL. No.
107, TO ENABLE INDIANS TO BECOME CITIZENS, S. MISC. DOC. NO. 45-8 (Dec. 10, 1877).
177 Garrett, supra note 21, at 60.
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For the Friends of the Indian, citizenship and assimilation meant
equality and the good life. Their beliefs were largely correct for Indians
like Ely Parker, who had chosen to leave tribal society, as well as for
those whose tribal societies had already been destroyed. But for the
federal government, citizenship was a means to end the Indian problem
by ending Indian tribes. And for those trying to maintain tribal land,
culture, and political status-to retain, as the Omaha pled, "a little of
our Indian ways"-citizenship was an anathema.
2. Elk's Lawyers
Available records tell us almost nothing about who John Elk was or
how he came to file his petition for citizenship. What we do know is that
he was represented by A.J. Poppleton and John L. Webster, two
prominent Omaha attorneys fresh from their 1879 victory in Standing
Bear v. Crook.178 This fact may be more revealing about the case and
what catalyzed it than the contents of the petition.
Tribes and Indians had limited access to legal counsel in this
period. Tribes had initiated litigation on their own behalf since 1703,
when Mohegan leader Owenoco appealed Connecticut land settlements
to the Privy Council in London.179 Worcester v. Georgia,180 still
recognized as the most important case in federal Indian law,181 was
initiated and led by the Cherokee Nation. By the latter half of the
nineteenth century, however, the federal government controlled tribal
funds, and had to consent for their use to hire attorneys and supervised
their selection.182 Public interest and sympathy for Indians did mean
that pro bono lawyers were sometimes available. 183 But these attorneys
178 United States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. 695 (C.C.D. Neb. 1879).
179 See Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1055,
1067-68 (1995).
180 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
181 Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Results of Second Turtle Talk Poll: Worcester v. Georgia Most
Important Indian Law Precedent, TURTLE TALK (Mar. 19, 2009), https://
turtletalk.wordpress.com/2009/03/19/results-of-second-turtle-talk-poU-worcester-v-georgia-
most-important-indian-law-precedent.
182 In Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883), for example, Crow Dog's court-appointed
attorney had to petition Congress for funds for the appeal, and submitted his briefs and
arguments to the Bureau of Indian Affairs for approval. Sidney L. Harring, Crow Dog's Case: A
Chapter in the Legal History of Tribal Sovereignty, 14 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 191, 216-17 (1989).
As late as the 1950s, the United States used its control over tribal funds to disapprove contracts
with disfavored attorneys. See Bethany R. Berger, Williams v. Lee and the Debate Over Indian
Equality, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1475 (2011).
183 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903), for example, was financed by the Indian
Rights Association. Ann Laquer Estin, Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock: The Long Shadow, in THE
AGGRESSIONS OF CIVILIZATION: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY SINCE THE 1880s, at 215 (Sandra L.
Cadwalader & Vine Deloria, Jr. eds., 1984).
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usually came from the reformer class, and the very real claims of their
clients were often distorted through the interests of those that
represented them. Standing Bear v. Crook and Elk v. Wilkins were both
important vehicles for these reformers.
Although John Elk was almost invisible in the legal papers and
press about his case, Standing Bear was not. Standing Bear, or Ma-chu-
nah-zha, was one of several chiefs of the Ponca Tribe, which had been
moved in short succession first to a fraction of its former lands in
Nebraska, then to the Dakota Territory, and then to the Indian Territory
in present day Oklahoma.184 In the Indian Territory, -they found no
guaranteed lands or supplies waiting for them and within a year 158 of
the 581 Ponca-over one quarter of the tribe-had died.185 Standing
Bear himself lost his son, sister, brother, and mother-in-law.186 In
desperation, he and twenty-nine other Ponca fled the reservation,
making a forty-day trek to Nebraska, where the Omahas, relatives of the
Ponca, were willing to take them in.187 When they arrived, however,
federal troops under the command of General Crook arrested the
refugees and took them to the city of Omaha, imprisoning them
pending their return to Indian Territory. 188
There, Omaha Herald editor Thomas Tibbles interviewed the
refugees and witnessed their councils with General Crook.189 Moved by
their eloquence,190 (and likely happy to enhance his national profile)
184 James A. Lake, Sr., Standing Bear! Who?, 60 NEB. L. REv. 451,456-58, 468-71 (1981).
185 United States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. 695, 698 (C.C.D. Neb. 1879).
186 Criminal Cruelty, OMAHA HERALD, Apr. 1, 1879, at 4-5.
187 Lake, supra note 184, at 471-72.
188 Id. at 472.
189 Id. at 472-73.
190 These words from Ta-zha-but are a sample of this eloquence:
I sometimes think that the white people forget that we are human, that we love our
wives and children, that we require food and clothing, that we must take care of our
sick, our women and children, prepare not only for the winters as they come, but for
old age when we can no longer do as when we are young. But one Father made us all.
We have hands and feet, heads and hearts all alike. We also are men. Look at me. Am
I not a man? I am poor. These clothes are ragged. I have no others. But I am a man.
Criminal Cruelty, supra note 186. In his book on the case, Tibbles apparently cobbled together
Tah-zah-but's and the Merchant of Venice's words to make up his own version of Standing
Bear's closing argument:
[My] hand is not the color of yours, but if I pierce it, I shall feel pain. If you pierce
your hand, you also feel pain. The blood that will flow from mine will be of the same
color as yours. I am a man. The same God made us both.
THOMAS HENRY TIBBLES, BUCKSKIN AND BLANKET DAYS 201 (Bison Book 1969) (1905)
(quoting Standing Bear). In his original reporting, Tibbles wrote that Standing Bear stated,
You see me standing here. Where do you think I came from? From the water, the
woods[,] or where? God made me and he put me on my land; But I was ordered to
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Tibbles began a campaign on their behalf, organizing local churches and
publicizing their words in newspapers across the country. 191 He also
approached his friend John Lee Webster about representing them, and
at his request secured A.J. Poppleton as well. 192
Webster and Poppleton were among the state's leading lawyers and
key figures in the state Republican Party. Only thirty-two in 1879,
Webster had fought in the Civil War, been elected to the Nebraska
Legislature, and served as president of Nebraska's 1875 constitutional
convention. 193 Poppleton, a seasoned forty-nine, had been speaker of the
Nebraska Legislature, mayor of Omaha, and then the lead western
attorney for the Union Pacific Railway.194 Although likely committed to
the Ponca cause, they were also committed to building the State of
Nebraska; diminishing federal authority over Indians and their territory
was part of this goal.
Their habeas petition framed the case as one about the rights of
Indians to leave their tribes and assimilate with white society. It alleged
that Standing Bear and his followers had "a considerable time
before ... separated from the[ir] ... tribe," and no longer maintained
tribal relations.195 The petition claimed they had "made great
advancements in civilization," and were "actually engaged in
agriculture ... and were supporting themselves by their own labors."196
In his reply, U.S. District Attorney Genio Lambertson,97 insisted that
the complainants "still retain their tribal relations ... and owe allegiance
to the tribal head" of the Ponca, and "have not adopted and are not
pursuing the habits and vocations of civilized life."198 Relying on Dred
Scott's denial of jurisdiction over a suit by a noncitizen, Lambertson also
stand up and leave my land.... I want to go back to my old reservation to live there
and be buried in the land of my fathers.
The Writ of Liberty, OMAHA HERALD, May 3, 1879.
191 Lake, supra note 184, at 474.
192 ZYLYFF, THE PONCA CHIEFS: AN INDIAN'S ATTEMPT TO APPEAL FROM THE TOMAHAWK
TO THE COURTS 39-40 (Boston, Lockwood, Brooks & Co. 1880) [hereinafter THE PONCA
CHIEFS] (Thomas Henry Tibbles writing pseudonymously as "Zylyff').
193 2 OMAHA: THE GATE CITY AND DOUGLAS COUNTY, NEBRASKA: A RECORD OF
SETTLEMENT, ORGANIZATION, PROGRESS AND ACHIEVEMENT 986 (Arthur Cooper Wakeley ed.,
1917).
194 Id. at 5-6.
195 THE PONCA CHIEFS, supra note 192, at 42 (quoting the habeas petition).
196 Id. at 43 (quoting the habeas petition).
197 Also a Republican, Lambertson would later serve as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
under President Rutherford Hayes, counsel for the Interstate Commerce Commission, and
unsuccessful candidate for U.S. Senate. LXV REPORTS OF CASES IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
NEBRASKA, JANUARY AND SEPTEMBER TERMS 1902, at xvi (1904).
198 THE PONCA CHIEFS, supra note 192, at 51 (quoting the return brief).
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argued that as noncitizens the Ponca could not invoke the habeas
jurisdiction of the U.S. courts. 199
Lambertson's jurisdictional challenge relied on the law of an earlier
time. Given the Reconstruction-era enhancements to habeas
jurisdiction, the main legal question should have been easy: Was a
noncitizen included in the grant of the writ of habeas corpus to "any
person" in custody "in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or
law of the United States"?200 But Judge Elmer Scipio Dundy (who had
previously rejected Crook's claim that certain lands in Nebraska were
Indian territory)201 accepted the petitioners' grand narrative of the case.
The petitioners, he wrote, were "representatives of [a] wasted race,"
who, having "completely severed their tribal relations therewith, and
had adopted the general habits of the whites" were now "asking for
justice and liberty to enable them to adopt our boasted civilization, and
to pursue the arts of peace, which have made us great and happy as a
nation."202
Finding that an "individual Indian possesses the clear and God-
given right to withdraw from his tribe and forever live away from it, as
though it had no further existence," Dundy ruled that the federal
government could not force the petitioners to return to Indian
country. 03 But he conceded a point that doomed Ponca hopes of
remaining on the Omaha Reservation, agreeing that the military did
have the right to remove any unauthorized persons from Indian
reservations.204 Standing Bear could not be forcibly taken south, but had
no claim to remain on the Omaha Reservation in the north either.
The aftermath of Standing Bear v. Crook gave the lie to the
assimilationist story told by his lawyers. Rather than give up tribal ways,
Standing Bear, his followers, and over one hundred other Ponca,
returned to their old lands on the Niobara River.205 In 1881, the United
States agreed to confirm Ponca title to land there, but only to allot it
individually rather than create a new reservation. 06 Standing Bear
refused to accept an allotment, and the federal government tired of the
persistent Ponca chief. No longer an icon of an Indian who had severed
his tribal ties and pursued white man's habits, officials now decried
Standing Bear as a "shrewd, cunning savage... the only one of the
199 The Writ of Liberty, supra note 190.
200 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (emphasis added).
201 United States v. Crook, 179 F. 391 (D. Neb. 1875) (holding Crook had no authority to
arrest squatters on allegedly unceded Sioux territory).
202 United States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. 695, 695 (C.C.D. Neb. 1879).
203 Id. at 699.
204 Id. at 700.
205 HELEN JACKSON, A CENTURY OF DISHONOR 369-70 (Boston, Roberts Bros. 1889).
206 Lake, supra note 184, at 485-86.
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Ponca band who persists in the old savage way,"207 "too lazy to work, but
not too proud to beg," but for whose "pernicious conduct" his followers
"would have steadily gone forward towards civilization."208
Whatever the consequences for the Ponca, the Standing Bear
victory set those involved on a broader campaign to reform Indian
policy. Tibbles quickly wrote a book telling the story, 209 and along with
Standing Bear and Susette and Francis La Flesche, went on a speaking
tour to publicize the plight of the Ponca and the cause of Indian
reform.210 The tour was eagerly received in Boston, where former
abolitionists seized on the Indian question as their new cause.211 The
Ponca story made Indian reformers of two particularly important allies:
journalist Helen Hunt Jackson, who went on to write the influential
1881 book A Century of Dishonor on the plight of the Indian; and
Massachusetts Senator Henry L. Dawes, who became chairman of the
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs in 1881 and drafted the Dawes
Allotment Act of 1887.212
Elk v. Wilkins was likely a facet of the Indian reformers' campaign.
Money from sales of the Tibbles' book went to a fund to secure the
Ponca lands and establish the rights of Indians in the Supreme Court.213
Elk's lawyers sent their bill for court costs to Boston for payment.2 14 An
article on Elk called it "part of proceedings by the friends of the Indians
to establish the status of Indians as citizens,"215 while district attorney
Lambertson dismissed the case as "an instance of 'the overflowing love
for the red man' of philanthropists in Boston and elsewhere."216
In his closing speech in Standing Bear's case, Webster had already
announced the legal arguments he would make on behalf of John Elk:
When an Indian severed tribal relations, he by that act became a
citizen.217 With the arguments prepared and the research done, all that
was needed was a client.
207 Id. at 488 (quoting H.R. EXEC. DOC. 51-1, at 146 (1890) (statement of Ponca Sub-Agent
James E. Helms)).
208 Id. (quoting H.R. EXEC. DOC. 51-1, at 147 (statement of missionary John E. Smith)).
2o9 THE PONCA CHIEFS, supra note 192.
210 Lake, supra note 184, at 491-93.
211 THE INDIAN REFORM LETTERS OF HELEN HUNT JACKSON, 1879-1885, at 8 (Valerie Sherer
Mathes ed., 1998).
212 Id. at 6, 8, 17.
213 Helen Hunt Jackson, The Story of the Poncas, N.Y. EVENING POST, Dec. 17, 1879, at 1,
reprinted in THE INDIAN REFORM LETERS OF HELEN HUNT JACKSON, supra note 211, at 41-42.
214 Letter from John L. Webster, to James H. McKinney, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court (Mar.
17, 1884) (on file at Entry 21, Record Group 267, NARA, D.C.).
215 Appeals to the Law, DAILY INTER OCEAN, Apr. 16, 1880, at 5.
216 Can "Lo" Vote? The Arguments on the Question Before the U.S. Court, OMAHA HERALD,
Jan. 15, 1881, at 8 (quoting Lambertson).
217 The Writ of Liberty, supra note 190.
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3. Citizenship for John Elk
And how did John Elk become that crucial client? The petition
presents the case as one about voting rights, demanding (a perhaps
exorbitant) $6,000 to compensate for Charles Wilkins' refusal to permit
Elk to vote in an Omaha city council election.218 But Poppleton and
Webster filed the petition just nine days after the registration attempt,
suggesting that Elk sought to register to create a test case.2 19 The records
in the case tell us almost nothing about John Elk, not even the name of
his tribe; other records say little more. What can be pieced together,
however, suggests that John Elk's plea for citizenship had little in
common with Ely Parker's quest for robust advancement in non-Indian
society. Rather, it was likely an attempt to escape the whims of federal
control in order to build and maintain his relationships to land, family,
and community.
On the petition in his case, Elk signs his name with an X, the mark
of illiteracy.220 According to 1880 census records, Elk was thirty-five
years old, worked as a laborer, could neither read nor write, and lived
with his wife in a wigwam on the banks of the Missouri River.221 He was
born in Iowa in 1845, although his parents were born in Wisconsin.222
While the census records only indicate Elk's race and not his tribe,
several newspaper accounts of the case report that he was Winnebago.223
No one who has written about Elk's case has noted the significance of
his tribal affiliation. Together with his geographic background, it opens
a window on a long story of suffering at a fickle and cruel federal Indian
policy.
The Ho-Chunk, named Winnebago by neighboring tribes,224 were
once a powerful people with villages scattered across Wisconsin, Iowa,
218 Transcript of Record at 2, Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884) (No. 305) [hereinafter Elk
Record].
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 4 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 10TH CENSUS 1880, NEBRASKA, DOUGLAS COUNTY 34
(Supervisor's Dist. No. 2, Enumeration Dist. No. 20) [hereinafter 1880 DOUGLAS COUNTY
CENSUS].
222 Id.
223 See, e.g., Appeals to the Law, supra note 215; Can "Lo" Vote? The Arguments on the
Question Before the U.S. Court, supra note 216; The Indian's Vote, OMAHA HERALD, Jan. 12,
1881, at 5.
224 The Ho-Chunk's name for themselves is variously translated as the People of the Parent
Speech and People with the Big Voice. Winnebago, meaning People of the Stinking Waters, is
an Algonquin name derived from their location on Green Bay, whose mudflats had an odor at
low tide. Nancy Oestreich Lurie, Winnebago, in 15 HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS
690, 696 (Bruce G. Trigger ed., 1978) [hereinafter Lurie, Winnebago]. Although the Wisconsin
tribe formed by the descendants of these people now call themselves the Ho-Chunk, I use the
term Winnebago because it is both the official name of the Nebraska tribe from which John Elk
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and Illinois, but by the early 1800s they had concentrated near Green
Bay, Wisconsin. In 1832, under federal pressure, the tribe signed a treaty
exchanging half their Wisconsin territory for land in the "Neutral
Ground" in Iowa.225 The Neutral Ground was actually contested no-
man's land between warring Sauk and Fox tribes, and the Winnebago
were beset by Sauk soldiers.226 Nevertheless, the United States
immediately began pressuring the Winnebago to cede their remaining
land in Wisconsin and relocate to Iowa. In 1837, while nineteen chiefs
were on a diplomatic trip in Washington, federal treaty commissioners
refused to allow them to leave until they signed a land cession treaty.227
They finally agreed to sign after being told that the treaty gave them
eight years to leave Wisconsin. In fact, the treaty allowed them only
eight months to leave; the federal negotiators had been instructed to
deceive them to secure the land cessions.228
Although many Winnebago refused to comply with the treaty, the
federal government rounded them up and forced them across the
Mississippi River.229 John Elk was born in Iowa during this period.
While some fled Iowa and returned home, by 1846, 2,600 Winnebago
were settled in Iowa, a school had been established there, and farms
started.230
But by that time, white settlers were petitioning to obtain the Iowa
reservation for their own. 231 In 1846, the Winnebago were forced to
exchange the Iowa reservation for one in central Minnesota.232 Again,
the United States had picked unwisely: the reservation was in the middle
of warring Sioux and Chippewa bands, historic enemies of the
Winnebago; it was heavily wooded and unsuitable for farming; and its
timber was already drawing white trespassers. 233 In 1855, the
Winnebago were permitted to exchange their lands for safer and more
fertile lands in Blue Earth, Minnesota.234
likely descended, see WINNEBAGO TRIBE OF NEBRASKA, http://www.winnebagotribe.com (last
visited Dec. 20, 2015) (tribal website), and the term used in historical documents.
225 Jason Tetzloff, Indian Removal: The Winnebago as a Case Study, 1825-1875, at 17-18
(May 22, 1989) (unpublished paper, University of Wisconsin), http://minds.wisconsin.edu/
handle/1793/34813.
226 Id. at 17.
227 Id. at 21.
228 Lurie, Winnebago, supra note 224, at 696-98.
229 Tetzloff, supra note 225, at 26-27.
230 Id. at 27.
231 Id. at 27-28.
232 Id. at 28-29.
233 Id. at 29.
234 Id. at 31.
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On the Blue Earth reservation, the Winnebago hoped that "they
had finally found a permanent home."235 They established farms, and
houses began to replace wigwams.236 Even there, all was not well. The
reservation agent was quick to depose any chief who did not conform to
his civilization plan, and white settlers-some of whom were already
trespassing on their lands-soon began petitioning to remove them.237
To ward off removal, the Winnebago signed an 1859 treaty to cede the
western portion of their reservation and have the remainder allotted to
them individually.238 But the Senate-perhaps bowing to settler
agitation-delayed ratifying the treaty, so neither the patents for the
allotments or the money from the land sale to farm them were
forthcoming.239
Despite their treatment by the United States, a number of
Winnebago men enlisted with the Union army when the Civil War
broke out.2 40 But after violence between Dakota and Minnesota soldiers
and settlers in 1862, the peaceful Winnebago were expelled from the
state along with the Dakota, and forced to relocate to drought-stricken,
infertile lands in South Dakota.241 They made the forced trek in the
depths of winter; of 1934 Winnebago that left Minnesota, only 1382
arrived.242 Though ordered to remain on the reservation under pain of
death, almost all escaped by the summer of 1864.243 Of these, 1200
settled among the Omaha in Nebraska, while the rest scattered, some
rejoining the fugitive Wisconsin Winnebago.244
In an 1865 treaty, the United States agreed to create a reservation
for the tribe in Nebraska, but by this time many had lost faith in federal
promises. 245 In the 1870s, allotment began under the treaty, but the
Winnebago had soured on fickle attempts to turn them into farmers;
235 Nancy 0. Lurie, The Winnebago Indians: A Study in Cultural Change 137 (1952)
[hereinafter Lurie, Cultural Change] (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Northwestern
University).
236 Id. at 137-38.
237 WINNEBAGO ORATORY: GREAT MOMENTS IN THE RECORDED SPEECH OF THE
HOCHUNGRA, 1742-1887, at 84-85 (Mark Diedrich ed., 1991) [hereinafter WINNEBAGO
ORATORY]; Tetzloff, supra note 225, at 31-32.
238 WINNEBAGO ORATORY, supra note 237, at 85.
239 Lurie, Cultural Change, supra note 235, at 142.
240 Lurie, Winnebago, supra note 224, at 700.
241 Colette Routel, Minnesota Bounties on Dakota Men During the U.S.-Dakota War, 40 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 12 (2013).
242 Lurie, Cultural Change, supra note 235, at 150.
243 Id. at 149-50.
244 Id. at 150.
245 Id. at 176.
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many quickly sold or leased their land to whites, becoming laborers like
Elk.246
While the treaty-abiding faction was forcibly moved again and
again, some Winnebago remained illegally in Wisconsin and others
returned there in flight from ill-fated reservations.247 It is possible that
Elk rejoined this group from Iowa, Minnesota, or South Dakota. In the
winter of 1874, however, federal troops rounded up the Wisconsin
Winnebago and marched them to Nebraska; a number died on the
way.248 By September, the federal agent noted that more than half of the
Wisconsin Winnebago had already fled, and those that remained had
"set up the cry of dissatisfaction" and "unsettled and demoralized a
number of the young men of the reservation."249
We cannot know how John Elk wound up in a wigwam in Omaha,
almost one hundred miles downriver of the Nebraska Winnebago
reservation-about twenty other Indians lived in wigwams next to Elk,
most slightly younger and born in Minnesota to Wisconsin parents,
suggesting they too were Winnebago survivors of multiple removals.250
We can be relatively sure, however, that Elk had experienced either a
lifetime of forced removals or one of evading federal authority in
Wisconsin only to be forcibly marched to Nebraska. Perhaps he traveled
to Omaha out of disillusionment with reservation life; perhaps he was
displaced by the initial allotments of the Winnebago reservation;
perhaps he left simply to look for work. He may well have resented that
after all he had suffered in the name of the federal campaign to
assimilate Native people with white society, that society still denied him
the right to vote. But he probably sought citizenship less from a desire
for full assimilation than from a plea to escape the federal campaign of
domination and civilization, a campaign whose costs he already knew
far too well.
246 Lurie, Winnebago, supra note 224, at 700; 1883 COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFF. ANN.
REP. 106 (stating that the Winnebago had a "natural indifference to farming" but "their value as
laborers is known to the people living near the reserve").
247 Tetzloff, supra note 225, at 37-38.
248 Id. at 38.
249 1874 COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFF. ANN. REP. 211 (report of Taylor Bradley, U.S.
Indian Agent, Winnebago Agency).
250 1880 DOUGLAS COUNTY CENSUS, supra note 221.
[Vol. 37:11851218
BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP ON TRIAL
B. United States v. Wong Kim Ark
1. The Significance of Citizenship for Ethnic Chinese in America
While citizenship had dubious desirability for American Indians in
the nineteenth century, there was no such ambiguity for ethnic Chinese
in America. But here too there is a divergence from the romanticism
often associated with citizenship. Although some ethnic Chinese
certainly did seek citizenship from a sense of belonging in the American
polity, many maintained important connections with China. Attempts
to reject and exclude Chinese, however, catalyzed efforts to seek
citizenship to blunt the edge of discrimination and to resist exclusion.
At the same time, racism and violence in their adopted homes
encouraged the migrants to maintain ties with China and discouraged
the sense of belonging and allegiance American rhetoric espoused.
Although many early Chinese migrants were fleeing political and
economic upheaval in China,251 most planned to return to China before
their deaths or to have their bones buried there if they could not.2 52 Even
before the advent of immigration restrictions, moreover, few Chinese
women migrated, both because of the expense and lack of work for
women overseas and because of responsibilities for caring for parents
and in-laws at home.253 Male migrants also had ties of responsibility and
tradition not only to their wives, but also their parents, clans, and home
villages. Indeed, huiguan, mutual aid societies for those from the same
districts, provided the social organization for the migrant
communities.254
Despite these ties, some migrants fully shifted allegiance to the
United States,255 and all experienced cultural and economic
transformation.56 Nevertheless, the early rhetoric on behalf of Chinese
251 RONALD TAKAKI, A DIFFERENT MIRROR: A HISTORY OF MULTICULTURAL AMERICA 192-
93 (1993).
252 JEAN PFAELZER, DRIVEN OUT: THE FORGOTTEN WAR AGAINST CHINESE AMERICANS 341
(2007).
253 Sucheng Chan, Race, Ethnic Culture, and Gender in the Construction of Identities Among
Second- Generation Chinese Americans, 1880s to 1930s, in CLAIMING AMERICA: CONSTRUCTING
CHINESE AMERICAN IDENTITIES DURING THE EXCLUSION ERA 127, 127 (K. Scott Wong &
Sucheng Chan eds., 1998) [hereinafter CLAIMING AMERICA] (discussing cultural demands
limiting female migration).
254 HIM MARK LAI, BECOMING CHINESE AMERICAN: A HISTORY OF COMMUNITIES AND
INSTITUTIONS 40-46 (2004); QIN, supra note 125, at 27-28.
255 See, e.g., K. Scott Wong, Cultural Defenders and Brokers: Chinese Responses to the Anti-
Chinese Movement, in CLAIMING AMERICA, supra note 253, at 3, 20, 22-23 (discussing the
naturalization and "cultural metamorphosis" of Yung Wing).
256 Immigrants defied early Qing dynasty prohibitions on emigration, transformed their
economic lives and possibilities, and became jinshanke-Gold Mountain guests-when they
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migrants described them not as aspiring members of American society,
but sojourners, valued guests, and beneficiaries of diplomatic
relationships between China and the United States.257
Anti-Chinese oppression, however, enhanced and catalyzed efforts
to achieve citizenship. In the mid- 1870s, an officer of one of the Chinese
immigrant associations testified before the California Senate that
Chinese immigrants wished to become citizens in part to influence anti-
Chinese legislation.258 In 1878, four San Francisco Chinese brought a
test case seeking to naturalize.259 The federal court quickly rejected the
petition, finding-despite many previous instances of Chinese
naturalizing260-that one could "scarcely fail to understand" that the
term "white" signified only members of the Caucasian race. 61 The 1882
Exclusion Act mooted similar claims by providing explicitly that
Chinese were ineligible to naturalize.262 In reaction to the 1882 Act,
Wong Chin Foo gathered fifty naturalized ethnic Chinese together in
New York to promote political participation, noting that "the moment
you appear at the ballot box you are a man and a brother and are treated
to cigars, whiskeys and beers."263 Historian Qingsong Zhang argues that
Chinese in the United States first began to refer to themselves as
"Chinese Americans" rather than sojourners in protest against the 1.882
law. 264
As the exclusion period progressed, citizenship became even more
important for ethnic Chinese in the United States. Although much
legislation expressly targeted "Chinese" or "Mongolians," states also
returned to their former villages. HAIMING LIU, THE TRANSNATIONAL HISTORY OF A CHINESE
FAMILY: IMMIGRANT LETTERS, FAMILY BUSINESS, AND REVERSE MIGRATION 6 (2005).
257 In seeking passage of the Burlingame Treaty, for example, the Six Companies emphasized
the importance of China in American commerce, and sought protections for Chinese "visiting
or residing" in the United States equivalent to "the citizens or subjects of the most favored
nation." Burlingame Treaty, China-U.S., art. 6, July 28, 1868, 16 Stat. 739, 740; see also
Qingsong Zhang, The Origins of the Chinese Americanization Movement: Wong Chin Foo and
the Chinese Equal Rights League, in CLAIMING AMERICA, supra note 253, at 41, 53 (discussing
1877 memorial by the Six Companies).
258 Charles J. McClain, Tortuous Path, Elusive Goal: The Asian Quest for American
Citizenship, 2 ASIAN L.J. 33, 36 (1995).
259 Id.
260 See Zhang, supra note 257, at 47, 52 (describing a gathering of fifty naturalized Chinese
Americans in New York in 1883 and noting that Wong Chin Foo had been naturalized by a
federal court in Michigan in 1874).
261 In re Ah Yup, 1 F. Cas. 223, 223 (C.C.D. Cal. 1878). For extended discussions of the
shifting boundaries of whiteness in interpreting the naturalization act, see IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ,
WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996), and Devon W. Carbado, Yellow
by Law, 97 CAL. L. REV. 633 (2009).
262 Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, § 14, 22 Stat. 58.
263 Zhang, supra note 257, at 47-48 (quoting The Chinamen Organizing, N.Y. TIMES, July 30,
1884).
264 Zhang, supra note 257, at 48-49.
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enacted less constitutionally suspect laws excluding those who were "not
eligible for citizenship"265 or had not "in good faith ... declared their
intent[] to become citizens"266-categories targeting Chinese and other
Asians unable to naturalize-from various rights and privileges.267 After
1888, citizenship was necessary for Chinese laborers legally in the
United States to travel to and from the United States. 268
Even worse, the 1892 Geary Act269 provided that all Chinese
laborers in the United States must register for a certificate of residence,
that any person of Chinese descent could be seized and hauled before a
commissioner or court to prove legal residence, and that all those found
not entitled to remain in the United States would be sentenced to one
year hard labor and then deported.270 The Geary Act inspired further
Americanization campaigns. The Chinese American Equal Rights
League issued a statement declaring it had "no sympathy for those
[who] ... refuse to become Americanized," and requiring each member
to "adopt American custom[], to cut off his queue, and wear the
regulation clothing used in the United States."271 In 1895, as Wong Kim
Ark's petition was pending before the Supreme Court, other native-born
Chinese formed the Native Sons of the Golden State (invoking the name
of the nativist group the Native Sons of the Golden West) to protect
their rights, promote patriotism, and advocate political and cultural
participation. 272
Although exclusion encouraged citizenship and assimilation
campaigns, it also encouraged ethnic Chinese to maintain ties with
China. As early as the 1850s, leaders of the immigrant community
argued that "[i]f the privileges of your laws are open to us" more
Chinese would "acquire your habits, your language,... your feelings."273
The privileges of the laws were not opened-instead, Chinese faced
265 Oregon Alien Land Law, ch. 350, 1949 Or. Laws 503 (1949).
266 WASH. CONST. art. II, § 33, repealed by WASH. CONST. amend. XLII.
267 See STATES' LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR 51, 289, 349, 378, 387, 442, 491 (Pauli Murray
ed., 1997) (reprinting text of numerous state laws).
268 Scott Act, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504 (1888); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581
(1889).
269 Geary Act, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25 (1892).
270 Id. §§ 2-4, 6. The Supreme Court quickly upheld the law, declaring an "absolute and
unqualified" power in the federal government to expel foreigners within its borders, and
authorizing individuals across the country to make citizen's arrests of those they suspected of
being deportable. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893); cf. Wong Wing v.
United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896) (holding that a judicial trial was necessary before
deportees could be sentenced to hard labor).
271 Salyer, Wong Kim Ark, supra note 30, at 64 (quoting the Chinese American Equal Rights
League).
272 Sue Fawn Chung, Fighting for Their American Rights: A History of the Chinese American
Citizens Alliance, in CLAIMING AMERICA, supra note 253, at 95, 98.
273 Wong, supra note 255, at 16 (quoting Hab Wa & Long Achick, The Chinese in California:
Letter of the Chinamen to His Excellency Gov. Bigler, LIVING AGE, July 1852, at 32).
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concerted efforts to exclude them wherever they laid down roots. And
while in other countries, Chinese women and children began to join
male immigrants after the initial waves of migration, exclusion laws
prevented this pattern from emerging in the United States.274 Unable to
establish families and facing legal and extralegal violence and
discrimination in America, Chinese immigrants continued to look to
China as a place of greater acceptance. Even so, they fought hard to
remain in their adopted countries, traveling to new towns when they
were violently driven out of others, and employing litigation, lobbying,
and collective action to remain in the country that fiercely sought to
exclude them.275
Regardless of whether they embraced full assimilation or distinctly
Chinese American identities, citizenship became a key goal of ethnic
Chinese in America. Although it could not prevent extralegal violence
or even much legal discrimination, it was one limited way to fight back
and secure residence in the United States. With the naturalization route
firmly closed, birthright citizenship was the only way to achieve this
goal.
2. Wong's Lawyers
Although American Indians often had to rely on attorneys with
little awareness or concern for their clients' interests, this was not the
case for the Chinese. Chinese organized through what became known as
the Chinese Six Companies to bring a multifaceted campaign against
state, federal, and private discrimination and exclusion. In addition to
lobbying successes such as the Burlingame Treaty and the 1870 Civil
Rights Act, the Six Companies financed thousands of lawsuits
challenging exclusion and civil rights violations.276 As the NAACP was
not founded until 1909, and even then, W.E.B. DuBois was the only
African American among its executives,277 the Six Companies may be
274 GEORGE ANTHONY PEFFER, IF THEY DON'T BRING THEIR WOMEN HERE: CHINESE
FEMALE IMMIGRATION BEFORE EXCLUSION 16 (1999); Sucheng Chan, The Exclusion of Chinese
Women, 1870-1943, in CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND AMERICAN LAW 2, 2-3 (Charles McClain
ed., 1994) [hereinafter CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND AMERICAN LAW].
275 See PFAELZER, supra note 252, at 340-43.
276 QIN, supra note 125, at 51-52, 54, 89-90; LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS:
CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW, at xiii (1995)
[hereinafter SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS] (over 7000 lawsuits brought in the first decade of
Chinese exclusion).
277 NAACP: 100 Years of History, NAACP, http://www.naacp.org/pages/naacp-history (last
visited Dec. 20, 2015).
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the earliest cause lawyering organization directed by the discriminated-
against group.2 78
Chinese in the United States originally organized through their
huiguan, mutual aid societies representing migrants from the same
districts in China.279 Huiguan pooled funds to provide care for the sick
and injured, coffin and funeral expenses, and aid for those who could
not return to China on their own.280 In response to oppression in the
United States, the six most important huiguan joined forces to form an
organization open to all Chinese.281 Although best-translated as the
"Chinese Native Place Association,"282 -because merchants were the
leaders of the huiguan, the English name for the organization was the
"Chinese Six Companies,"283 and remained so even after seventh and
eighth huiguan joined.284 This name was consistent with anti-Chinese
propaganda characterizing the Six Companies as virtual slave masters,2 85
"long-nailed mandarins who control the destinies of the Chinese in this
country."286
The Six Companies used membership dues to employ attorney
Colonel Frederick Bee as their spokesman, keep Thomas Riordan, Hall
McCallister, and other attorneys on retainer, and hire yet others on a
less frequent basis.287 After China established a consulate in California
in 1878, Bee and Riordan went on joint retainer with both
organizations, and, for a time, litigation was coordinated between the
two. 28 8
In the first decade of the exclusion laws, Chinese litigants brought
over 7000 challenges to their validity and implementation, and won the
278 Other scholars, particularly Charles McClain, have powerfully demonstrated the
revolutionary nature of this litigation. See CHARLES J. MCCLAIN, IN SEARCH OF EQUALITY: THE
CHINESE STRUGGLE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1994);
CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note 274. My discussion here differs from
earlier scholarship in focusing on this litigation as a product of an overarching organization.
279 QIN, supra note 125, at 27-28.
280 LAI, supra note 254, at 46; QIN, supra note 125, at 27-29.
281 QIN, supra note 125, at 45.
282 The transliteration of the Chinese name is Zh6nghud (Chinese) Huiguan (Native Place
Association), or Jinshan Zhongua Huiguan (Gold Mountain Chinese Native Place Association),
but the organization later incorporated with the English name as the Chinese Consolidated
Benevolent Association. LAI, supra note 254, at 49-50.
283 QIN, supra note 125, at 45.
284 LAI, supra note 254, at 50-51.
285 See, e.g., PFAELZER, supra note 252, at 26 (discussing allegation that the Six Companies
were importing "slaves of a degraded caste" (quoting San Francisco merchant Lai Chun-
Chuen)).
286 Funds for the Fight, S.F. MORNING CALL, Sept. 11, 1892, at 8.
287 QIN, supra note 125, at 89-90, 106-09.
288 Id. at 106-07, 120.
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vast majority.289 Thomas Riordan alone was a lawyer in 2900 habeas
cases in this period.290 While some of this litigation surely originated
outside the Six Companies, the volume and speed of litigation on behalf
of impoverished laborers-many confined on steamships offshore
without access to family, friends, or prospective employers-would not
have been possible without coordinated and independently-financed
counsel. An 1889 article (entitled Chinese Wiles) even attributed the fact
that habeas writs were not taken out immediately after thirty-two
Chinese migrants were confined to their ship to the death of Consul
Bee's wife the night before.291
In civil rights cases as well, the Chinese unleashed the power of the
law in revolutionary ways. The best known of these cases is Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, argued by Hall McCallister, which successfully challenged
implementation of a San Francisco law banning wooden laundries-the
first Supreme Court case invalidating a facially neutral law due to its
discriminatory application under the Equal Protection Clause.292 Six
Companies financed litigation also established many less well-known
civil rights landmarks.293 Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan294 challenged San
Francisco's practice of cutting off the queues of imprisoned Chinese
pursuant to an ordinance regulating prisoner hair length, arguably
providing broader protection for religious rights than some more recent
decisions.295 In re Lee Sing invalidated the first racially discriminatory
289 SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS, supra note 276, at xiii. For an illuminating study of the
judges in these cases, see Christian G. Fritz, A Nineteenth-Century "Habeas Corpus Mill": The
Chinese Before the Federal Courts in California, in CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND AMERICAN LAW,
supra note 274, at 55, 55.
290 Attorneys, FREDERICK BEE HIST. PROJECT, http://frederickbee.com/habeasatttorneys.html
(last visited Dec. 21, 2015).
291 Chinese Wiles, SACRAMENTO DAILY REC.-UNION, Aug. 20, 1889, at 1.
292 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
293 Chinese litigated outside the Six Companies as well. The most famous of these cases is
Tape v. Hurley, 6 P. 129 (Cal. 1885), in which the Tapes hired William Gibson, the lawyer for
the counsel for the Chinese missions in San Francisco, to successfully challenge the exclusion of
Chinese from public schools. MAE NGAI, THE LUCKY ONES: ONE FAMILY AND THE
EXTRAORDINARY INVENTION OF CHINESE AMERICA 51 (Princeton Univ. Press 2012). Even this
case was not fully separate from the Six Companies: Otis Gibson, William's father and head of
the Chinese Mission, was a frequent collaborator with the Chinese consulate and Six
Companies, which participated in the Tape case from the beginning. QIN, supra note 125, at 83,
89, 107.
294 12 F. Cas. 252 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (invalidating practice of cutting off long braid, or
queue, worn by Chinese men).
295 See, e.g., Olff v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 404 U.S. 1042, 1045 n.4 (1972) (Douglas,
J., dissenting) (quoting Ho Ah Kow in dissent from denial of certiorari of cases upholding
school hair-length requirements); Longoria v. Dretke, 507 F.3d 898 (5th Cir. 2007) (rejecting
religious challenge to prison's short hair policy).
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zoning ordinance,96 anticipating the U.S. Supreme Court by twenty-
seven years. 297 Gandolfo v. Hartman found unconstitutional a covenant
prohibiting selling or leasing to Chinese,298 anticipating Shelley v.
Kraemer by a half century. 299 Repeatedly, this litigation showed the
transformative power of providing attorneys for individuals otherwise
unable to afford them.
The lawyers in these cases took on a deeply unpopular cause, and
suffered the repercussions. Frederick Bee was frequently caricatured in
anti-Chinese cartoons, 300 and his obituary noted that the sadness at his
death was "notwithstanding his office."' 301 -Thomas Riordan faced-
accusations of criminal conspiracy for his role in the boycott of the
Geary Act's registration requirements. 302 But in other ways, Bee and
Riordan would have had little in common with modern-day public
interest lawyers. Bee had run mining, telegraph, and railroad companies,
and was "one of the most prominent citizens of San Francisco."303
Riordan was a fixture at society events, 304 and a leader of the state and
local Republican Party.305 Although the Republican Party was associated
with greater tolerance for Chinese immigration, Joseph Napthaly, the
prominent attorney who initially filed Wong Kim Ark's habeas petition,
was a Democratic Party fixture.306
In fact, in some respects, advocacy for the Chinese was an
establishment cause. Anti-Chinese sentiment was deepest in the
working class, which linked Chinese labor with capitalist oppression; for
owners of railroad, mining, and agricultural businesses, however, the
296 In re Lee Sing, 43 F. 359 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1890); Charles J. McClain, In re Lee Sing: The
First Residential-Segregation Case, in CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note
274, at 223, 230, 232-34 [hereinafter McClain, In re Lee Sing].
297 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (invalidating zoning ordinance segregating
"colored" and white residents).
298 49 F. 181 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1892).
299 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
300 See Col. B's Hobby Horse, S.F. ILLUSTRATED WASP, Nov. 9, 1878 (picturing Bee atop a
Chinese man depicted as a horse crushing a white man beneath his hooves); The Golden Calf
Retained, S.F. ILLUSTRATED WASP, Mar. 15, 1879 (picturing Bee and others dancing around a
statue depicting a Chinese man as a calf).
301 Their Old Friend Gone, S.F. CALL, May 27, 1892.
302 Geary's Wrath, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1893, at 2.
303 China in America, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1878, at 2.
304 See, e.g., Engagement of Miss Denman and Col. Cheatham Is Announced at a Musicale
Given by Fiancee, S.F. CALL, Nov. 8, 1901, at 4; Society Was There-Wealth and Beauty at
Harvard-Yale Game, S.F. MORNING CALL, Nov. 20, 1892, at 8.
305 See Riordan Will Be League President-"De Machine" Will Be in Control of the
Republican Convention, L.A. HERALD, Apr. 27, 1900, at 5; Thomas D. Riordan Is Dead from
Heart Failure, S.F. CALL, June 18, 1905 (noting that Riordan had chaired the San Francisco
County Republican Committee for the last six years).
306 See, e.g., Well Ended-The Last Session of the State Convention, L.A. DAILY HERALD, May
18, 1888, at 3 (noting Napthaly's nomination as an elector in Democratic slate and platform's
opposition to Chinese immigration).
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Chinese were an inexpensive labor source.307 The huiguan, moreover,
were led by the merchant classes and acted in their interests.308 These
merchants and their advocates also sought to deploy racial and class
prejudices in their favor,, creating distinctions between the "better class"
of people who appreciated the Chinese and the labor agitators and low-
class European immigrants who attacked them.309 While the lawyers for
the Chinese played a heroic role, therefore, they did not sacrifice all class
or racial prejudice, or even an elite lifestyle, to do it.
What these lawyers did provide-and what American Indians
sorely lacked-was legal counsel organized and directed by the
community they represented. Although confined in a ship's hold off the
coast of San Francisco, through this community Wong Kim Ark could
mobilize the legal system to fully represent his interests.
3. Citizenship for Wong Kim Ark
As with John Elk, earlier scholarship seems to have missed a crucial
aspect of the meaning of citizenship for Wong Kim Ark. Immigration
documents show that his quest for citizenship was likely not primarily
one for individual autonomy or assimilation. These documents suggest
that for Wong, citizenship meant the ability to maintain distinctly
transnational familial, cultural, and community relationships.
Wong was born in 1873 or 1871310 at 751 Sacramento Street in San
Francisco, California,311 to Wong Si Ping and Wee Lee, who had
emigrated from China and established a "permanent residence" in San
Francisco "a long time prior" to his birth.312 Being American-born was a
rare status among ethnic Chinese. Although there were 105,000 ethnic
Chinese in the United States by 1880,313 only about one percent of them
had been born there.314
307 See, e.g., REASONS FOR CHINESE EXCLUSION, supra note 24.
308 LAI, supra note 254, at 50.
309 See, e.g., China in America, supra note 303 (quoting Frederick Bee); Funds for the Fight,
supra note 286 (quoting Chinese Vice-Consul King Owyang); Wyoming Massacre, Horrid
Butchery and Untold Agony of Suffering, DAILY ALTA CAL., Sept. 28, 1885 (quoting Bee).
310 Wong's birth year is .reported as 1873 in the habeas petition, but as 1871 in others. See
Transcript of Record at 6, United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (No. 132)
[hereinafter Wong Record] (stating that Wong was born in 1873); Testimony of Wong Kim
Ark, In re Wong Yook Fun, No. 9079/590-C (Immigration Service Dec. 6, 1910) (stating that
Wong was born in 1871).
311 Wong Record, supra note 310.
312 Id.
313 LEE, AMERICA'S GATES, supra note 127, at 238.
314 Salyer, Wong Kim Ark, supra note 30, at 58.
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Their numbers were growing,315 however, and after Congress
slammed the door to naturalization in 1882, anti-Chinese forces were
eager to close the remaining path to citizenship. In 1884, the San
Francisco customs collector denied entry to Look Tin Sing,316 a
fourteen-year-old merchant's son who had been born in Sacramento but
sent to China to be educated some years before.317 Riding circuit in
California, Justice Field ruled that both the Fourteenth Amendment and
the common law of the land compelled the conclusion that Look was
indeed a citizen.318
Nevertheless, collectors of customs kept stopping American-born
Chinese at the ports and the federal courts kept reversing them.319 This
refusal to follow judicial branch rulings is not surprising. Customs
collector was a political appointment, and collectors found it convenient
to enforce the local political wi11.320 In San Francisco, the customs office
even claimed that the "undercurrent of hostility to this race" would give
rise to violence if Chinese exclusion was not stringently enforced.321 The
port of San Francisco accordingly earned a reputation as the most
arduous processing center for Chinese immigrants.322 In particular,
John Wise, the collector who refused to admit Wong, described himself
as a "zealous opponent of Chinese immigration."323 Wise unabashedly
implemented his own interpretations of the law,324 including requiring
Chinese claiming birthright citizenship to present evidence from two
white witnesses to their birth. 325
Why would Wong make repeated trips between China and the
United States despite the expense and risk of exclusion? Although Wong
Si Ping had been a merchant, Wong Kim Ark became a cook-likely a
less lucrative position and one that classified him as a laborer,
315 Id. (noting that number had grown to eleven percent by 1900).
316 In re Look Tin Sing, 21 F. 905 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884).
317 Id.
318 Id.
319 See In re Wy Shing, 36 F. 553 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1888); In re Yung Sing Hee, 36 F. 437
(C.C.D. Or. 1888); Ex parte Chin King, 35 F. 354 (C.C.D. Or. 1888); see also Gee Fook Sing v.
United States, 49 F. 146 (9th Cir. 1892) (approving of rule but finding petitioner was not in fact
born in the United States). The reported decisions represent a small fraction of the cases on
behalf Chinese claiming birthright citizenship. Index of Habeas Cases by Attorney, FREDERICK
BEE HIST. PROJECT, http://www.frederickbee.com/habeastableoneatty.html (last visited Dec. 21,
2015) (showing over 100 habeas cases on behalf of American-born Chinese between 1882 and
1892).
320 LEE, AMERICA'S GATES, supra note 127, at 50.
321 Id. at 51 (quoting Letter from R.P. Schwerin, to John W. Linck (Feb. 9, 1898)).
322 Id.
323 Id. at 52 (quoting Letter from John Wise, to Special Agents Johnson & Bean (Apr. 3,
1895)).
324 Id.
325 SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS, supra note 276, at 65.
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presumptively barred by the 1888 Exclusion Act.326 Each trip for him
involved the cost, time, and risk of trans-Pacific passage, additional cost
of taking pictures and finding white witnesses to verify his right to
return, and the risk of exclusion or lengthy detention while the collector
of customs looked for an excuse to keep him out. And yet when his
parents returned to China in 1889, Wong went with them, returning
alone several months later, and left again in 1894, returning in 1895 to
be excluded and imprisoned offshore.
In Look Tin Sing's case, his lawyers had argued that his family had
assimilated, "abandoning Chinese garments, and conforming to the
customs of the country."327 Pictures of Wong Kim Ark from 1894, 1904,
and 1910, however, show a man in a queue and traditional dress; not
until 1914 (when the queue was no longer mandatory in China) do we
find Wong with short hair in a suit and tie.328 It was likely not an
unqualified embrace of American culture that motivated Wong's quest
for citizenship.
But immigration records also show that Wong had the best of
reasons to seek citizenship: maintaining a multigenerational set of
familial relationships and obligations. On his initial 1889 trip to China,
Wong married a woman from a nearby village.329 Although the new
couple conceived a son, Wong Yook Fun, Wong had already returned to
America by the time he was born.330 On his 1894 trip, Wong both met
his oldest son for the first time, and conceived another, Wong Yook
Thue. Wong would conceive another son, Wong Yook Sue, on a 1905
trip, and yet another, Wong Yook Jim, on a 1914 trip. 331
326 Act of Sept. 13, 1888, ch. 1015, §§ 5-6, 25 Stat. 476, 477 (1888).
327 Salyer, Wong Kim Ark, supra note 30, at 61 (quoting Agreed to Disagree, S.F. EVENING
BULL., Sept. 29, 1884, at 3). The choice to send Look to China to be educated while still a boy
may cast doubt on this assertion in Look Tin Sing as well.
328 Win. Fisher et al., Affidavit Certifying Identity of Wong Kim Ark, Nov. 5, 1894 (on file
with author); Affidavit of Wong Kim Ark, In re Wong Yoke Fun, Case 10434/137 (Jan. 31,
1910) (on file at Box 464, Loc. 3279 I, RG 85, NARA, San Bruno); Wong Kim Ark Certificate of
Departure, Nov. 11, 1914 (issued at the Port of San Francisco) (on file with author).
329 Affidavit of Wong Kim Ark, supra note 328. The affidavit gives the dates in the old
Chinese calendar; these translate into a marriage date of December 1889, and his son's
birthdate of October 1890. JOHN ENDICOTT GARDNER, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION., U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE & LABOR, AMERICAN-CHINESE CALENDAR FOR 65 YEARS, 1849-1914 (1904).
330 See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 653 (1898).
331 Testimony of Wong Kim Ark, In re Wong Yok Jim, Case No. 25141/5-6, at 2 (July 26,
1926) (on file at Box 3061, Loc. 3279 H, RG 85, NARA, San Bruno). It is possible that one or
more of these children were in fact "paper sons," who had won Wong's cooperation in their bid
to enter America. But Wong Yook Jim still identifies as Wong's son and the other three as his
brothers, see WILLIAM WONG, YELLOW JOURNALIST: DISPATCHES FROM ASIAN AMERICA 54
(2001) [hereinafter WONG, YELLOW JOURNALIST], and he arrived in the United States with the
assistance of Wong Yook Fun, the oldest son, and Wong Yook Sue, who lived with Wong in the
United States and testified in Wong Yook Jim's case. Testimony of Wong Kim Ark, supra.
Haiming Liu notes, moreover, that many of these paper sons were in fact part of kinship
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Wong was not alone in this transnational married life. Madeline
Hsu estimates that two-fifths of Chinese men in the United States in this
period had wives in China. 332 This status was in part compelled by racist
American laws and in part by long-standing strategies for combining
social mobility with intergenerational obligations.
Marriage was a filial responsibility, necessary to bear children to
continue the family line, ensure the continued worship of one's
ancestors, 333 and provide a wife to live with and care for one's parents in
their old age. 334 But Wong would have had little chance of finding a
suitable bride in the United States. In 1880, California specifically
prohibited marriage between whites and "Mongolians," while
neighboring jurisdictions Arizona, Oregon, Idaho, and Nevada had
already done so. 335 Among Chinese in America, however, there were at
least fourteen men for every woman, 336 and many of those present
would have been merchants' wives, merchants' daughters with higher
aspirations than marriage to a cook, or prostitutes and their children.337
Wong's family might have sought a bride in China even had one
been available in the United States. Marriages were negotiated by
prospective in-laws,338 and Chinese parents might reject American-born
girls, who were thought to be less virtuous and less likely to continue
support of the husband's family.339 And, of course, if the parents wished
to eventually return to China, the bride must be there as well.
Wong Si Ping and Wee Lee would have had many reasons not to
wish to grow old in San Francisco. The late 1880s had seen Chinese
communities up and down the West Coast driven, beaten, and burned
networks, and so would have been part of Wong's family in any case. LiU, supra note 256, at 2,
91.
332 MADELINE Y. HSU, DREAMING OF GOLD, DREAMING OF HOME: TRANSNATIONALISM AND
MIGRATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH CHINA, 1882-1943, at 99 (2000). An
empirical study found that as many as half of ethnic Chinese men in San Francisco had
nonresident wives. Sucheng Chan, Against All Odds: Chinese Female Migration and Family
Formation on American Soil During the Early Twentieth Century, in CHINESE AMERICAN
TRANSNATIONALISM: THE FLOW OF PEOPLE, RESOURCES, AND IDEAS BETWEEN CHINA AND
AMERICA DURING THE EXCLUSION ERA, at 34, 41-42 (Sucheng Chan ed., 2006).
333 HSU, supra note 332, at 100.
334 Id. at 103-05.
335 Deenesh Sohoni, Unsuitable Suitors: Anti-Miscegenation Laws, Naturalization Laws, and
the Construction of Asian Identities, 41 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 587, 596 tbl.2 (2007).
336 1900 CENSUS, supra note 49, at 492 (reporting 111,062 Chinese men and 7996 Chinese
women in the United States).
337 One fascinating study suggests that most resident Chinese-born wives arrived as
prostitutes. Chan, supra note 332, at 34, 41-58.
338 HSU, supra note 332, at 95.
339 Id. at 102.
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out of their homes.340 In the year that they left, San Francisco hosted
speeches by the racist labor organizer Denis Kearney; condemned and
tore down buildings in Chinatown;341 dug up Chinese coffins in an old
cemetery;342 and was on the verge of passing a law directing that all
Chinese move to a portion of the city otherwise reserved for
slaughterhouses and hog factories.343 After two decades in the United
States and with a son of marriageable age, Wong's parents likely decided
to find a nice girl to help secure their retirement and progeny in a
country that would accept them. Wong's status as a "Gold Mountain
guest" would only have enhanced his marriageability: With the promise
of a good income and children, and a not unduly interfering husband,
his bride might hope for a secure and even fulfilling life. 3 44
On November 15, 1894, Wong returned to his family in China.345
He would have arrived in time for the Dongzhi holiday, at which
Chinese traditionally connect with family and make offerings to
ancestors. 346 His departure papers included affirmations by three white
witnesses of his birth in San Francisco and a photo in which he looks
hopeful, apprehensive, and very, very young. 347 When he returned in
August 1895, collector Wise refused to allow him to land.348 He was held
on the steamer Coptic until it left harbor, then transferred to the
steamer Gaelic, and then to the steamer Peking after the Gaelic too
left.349 He was not ordered released on bond until January 3, 1896, after
five months a prisoner.35 0
In her study of the three generations of the transnational Chang
family, Haiming Liu writes, "Family and home are one word, jia, in the
Chinese language. Family can be apart, home relocated, but jia remains
intact, as it signifies a system of mutual obligations and a set of cultural
values," enabling families
to survive long physical separation, expand economic activities
beyond a national boundary, and accommodate continuities and
340 PFAELZER, supra note 252, at 195 (Truckee, Cal., in 1886); id. at 209-11 (Rock Springs,
Wyo.); id. at 215 (Seattle & Newcastle, Wash., in 1885); id. at 219-33 (Tacoma, Wash., in 1885);
id. at 237 (San Jose, Cal., in 1887).
341 The Condemned Buildings, DAILY ALTA CAL., Aug. 27, 1889, at 4.
342 Eighty-Six Skeletons in All, DAILY ALTA CAL., Mar. 2, 1889, at 1.
343 McClain, In re Lee Sing, supra note 296, at 229-30.
344 Hsu, supra note 332, at 104.
345 Wm. Fisher et al., Affidavit Certifying Identity of Wong Kim Ark, supra note 328 (stamp
affixed indicating "departed from San Francisco ... Nov 15 1984").
346 See SHU JIANG Lu, WHEN HUAI FLOWERS BLOOM: STORIES OF THE CULTURAL
REVOLUTION 143-44 (2007) (describing author's experience of returning to make offerings to
grandparents).
347 Win. Fisher et al., Affidavit Certifying Identity of Wong Kim Ark, supra note 328.
348 Wong Record, supra note 310, at 8.
349 Id. at 2.
350 Id. at 23-24.
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discontinuities in the process of social mobility.... When social
instability in China and a hostile racial environment in the United
States prevented them from being rooted on either side of the Pacific,
transnational family life became a focal point of their social
existence. 35'
Wong, confined for months on steamships off the San Francisco coast,
would have been sustained by his family and home, by the ties that
made them stretch across oceans and years to exist wherever he was. He
would have thought of his parents, wife, and children, all waiting and
depending on him reaching the Gold Mountain again, and known that
citizenship was the key to both meeting his obligations and seeing them
again.
C. Conclusion
Both the differences and the similarities between the stories of Elk
v. Wilkins and United States v. Wong Kim Ark contain important
lessons. The differences in part reflect the different positions of
American Indians and ethnic Chinese in America, the first as self-
governing peoples whose land was colonized by the United States, the
second as migrants to an existing nation. But for both groups,
citizenship was closely linked with subordination-for American
Indians, as either the means of tribal destruction or an effort to escape
its effects, while for Chinese, the boundary that denied them the right to
establish families and homes in the United States. For each,
abandonment of past community and culture was held up as an ideal,
although for American Indians the asserted possibility of achieving this
ideal justified coercion and expropriation, while for Chinese the asserted
impossibility of achieving it justified forcible exclusion and
discrimination. Through their cases, both litigants seem to have defied
both state coercion and the ideals of citizenship, Elk by trying to escape
the federal domination that sought to destroy tribal culture and
territory, and Wong by facilitating a distinctly transnational family with
ties to both China and America.
III. LITIGATION AND AFTERMATH
Although the opinions in Elk v. Wilkins and United States v. Wong
Kim Ark have important places in American law, they cannot be fully
understood without their aftermath. Congress quickly blunted the
351 Liu, supra note 256, at 1-2.
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impact of each decision, in Elk by forcing citizenship, allotment, and
boarding school on Indians to shape them into individualistic
Americans, and in Wong Kim Ark by further restricting migration and
the means to challenge the restrictions. Through their communities,
Indians and Chinese both fought against these measures, ultimately
reshaping the meaning of citizenship in America. American efforts to
colonize Indians and exclude Chinese, however, created patterns for
early twentieth century encounters with other foreign peoples, both
migrants and colonized others.
A. Elk v. Wilkins
1. Litigation
On April 14, 1880, John Elk filed his petition in the U.S. Circuit
Court in the District of Nebraska alleging that he was a citizen and had
been denied the right to vote because of his race and color in violation
of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.352 Many of the other
participants were repeating their roles from Standing Bear v. Crook:
Poppleton and Webster represented the petitioner; U.S. Attorney
Lambertson represented the defendant; and Judge Dundy heard the
case. There were also two new players: Lambertson was joined by
attorney Edward W. Simeral, who oddly was also the notary
solemnizing Elk's petition; and more significantly, Judge Dundy was
joined by new Eighth Circuit Judge George Washington McCrary.353
McCrary had begun his law practice studying in the Iowa office of
future Supreme Court Justice Samuel Miller, then served in the House
of Representatives from 1866 to 1877, and was Secretary of War from
1877 to December 1879.354 As Secretary of War he oversaw the formal
end of Reconstruction with the withdrawal of the last troops from the
South; the suit against the military in Standing Bear v. Crook; as well as
the shattering of fading hopes for Grant's peace policy with, in
McCrary's words, "outbreaks" by the Apaches in New Mexico and the
"massacre" by Utes in White River, Colorado.355 He was unlikely to
sympathize with reformers who saw the Indian problem as one of
federal wrongs against innocent Indians.
352 Elk Record, supra note 218, at 2.
353 Id. at 1-3.
354 Edward A. Goedeken, McCrary, George Washington, BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY IOWA,
http://uipress.lib.uiowa.edu/bdi/DetailsPage.aspx?id=261 (last visited Dec. 21, 2015).
355 War Department Needs-Secretary M'Crary's Annual Report, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1879
(quoting George W. McCrary, Secretary of War).
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Although Wilkins' attorneys did not file their response until
November 8, it was less than 100 words long, a brief demurrer asserting
that the petition did not state sufficient facts to justify relief and that the
court lacked jurisdiction over both the defendant and subject matter.356
The court held a hearing in January of 1881,35s and in May sustained the
demurrer without written opinion and certified a writ of error to the
Supreme Court.358 The brief opinion and certification may reflect
disagreement between Judges Dundy and McCrary, as in the event of
disagreement between a district court and circuit judge, the opinion of
the circuit judge controlled, but the- case -would -be certified -to the
Supreme Court.359
In the Supreme Court, Elk's brief presented the case as an
extension of the ideals of Reconstruction. The "spirit of human liberty
and human rights" that inspired the Reconstruction amendments was
"planted on motives broad enough and grand enough to reach all classes
and all races and all colors."360 The 1866 Civil Rights Act declaring all
but "Indians not taxed" to be citizens indicated that Indians who had
left their tribes and lost their immunity from state taxation were in fact
citizens under the statute. 361 The Fourteenth Amendment omitted a
similar exception to "make a step in advance" of the 1886 law and
ensure that citizenship would not be dependent on taxation.362
The brief argued both that Indians in tribal relations might be
"subject to the jurisdiction of the United States"363 and that all Indians
had a right to abandon those relations and assume a new allegiance to
the United States.364 This individual decision to shift allegiance need not
receive the official imprimatur of naturalization, as tribes were not true
foreign powers. 365 Again, the brief invoked the abolition of slavery. "As
emancipation was the removal of the incapacity of slavery, so
expatriation... would be the removal of the tribal incapacity, and as the
Indian as well as the negro, was born in the United States, they become
citizens without naturalization."366
The brief concluded with a plea for Indian reform. Declaring
Indians as worthy of citizenship as the immigrants "we welcome to our
shores," the brief insisted that "[t]he time has gone by to shut the doors
356 Elk Record, supra note 218, at 4.
357 Can "Lo" Vote? The Arguments on the Question Before the U.S. Court, supra note 216.
358 Elk Record, supra note 218, at 6.
359 Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 1, 17 Stat. 196.
360 Brief for Plaintiff at 9, Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
361 Id. at 12-13.
362 Id. at 14.
363 Id. at 21-22.
364 Id. at 27.
365 Id.
366 Id.
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of justice against the Indian race on the plea that they are savages."367
Quoting "a prominent journalist" (in fact, Thomas Tibbles) on the
"absolute monarch[y]" of the Indian commissioner,368 invoking the
"massacred men and women and children of the Cheyennes,"369 and
calling the Indian Territory a "pest hole of death to northern tribes," the
brief asked what was the remedy to the "wrongs and oppressions, the
involuntary servitude" the Indians had suffered?370 "We answer:
Citizenship."371
Lambertson's brief for the appellee opened with the status of
Indian tribes as "separate nations, independent political communities,
and only in a very limited sense subject to our jurisdiction."372 The 1871
prohibition on further treaties, it asserted, did not "destroy the tribes as
political communities," but simply removed the treaty power, while the
Fourteenth Amendment did not include tribal members "because they
were not born in the allegiance of the United States except in a qualified
sense."373 While a man might independently throw off his natal
allegiance, he could not become a citizen of another country without
that country's consent.374
Without formal naturalization, moreover, "[h]ow is a registrar of
vote[r]s to know whether an Indian is subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States?" Would the test require an Indian to farm? To own land
individually? To otherwise demonstrate the habits of civilization? To
simply absent himself from his tribe? And if any of these were necessary,
how long ago would he need to have done it?375
The petition, Lambertson wrote, was impossibly vague on these
questions, stating neither Elk's tribe nor what he had done to subject
himself to the jurisdiction of the United States other than "a change in
mental allegiance."376 Indeed, for all the facts presented, Elk "seems to
have been dropped from the clouds to raise this question."377 No child of
a foreign minister born in the United States would be able to demand
citizenship simply by claiming she had transferred her allegiance; no
more, the brief argued, should an Indian born in tribal relations.378
367 Id. at 28.
368 Id. at 29 (quoting The Ponca Habeas Corpus Case, OMAHA HERALD, May 2, 1879, at 4).
369 Id.
370 Id. at 28-29.
371 Id. at 29 (emphasis omitted).
372 Brief and Argument of Defendant in Error at 3, Elk, 112 U.S. 94.
373 Id. at 5.
374 Id.
375 Id. at 10.
376 Id. at 7.
377 Ed.
378 Id. at 9.
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Although the brief cited the Indians who had been made landless
and impoverished by citizenship to argue that automatic citizenship
might result in "greater injustice,"379 its main policy arguments were
founded in racism. Indians were "a nation of aristocratic idlers" whose
"ideas of government are the simplest and rudest."380 It stretched the
principle of universal citizenship "to the verge of absurdity" to extend it
to "subjects of an independent political community, who have made the
tomahawk the arbiter of their wrongs."381 While citizenship might be
the ultimate goal for the Indians, it could only be achieved after a
government "course -of industry, instruction and constraint."32 Elk
himself was simply "an Indian savage or 'noble red man"' striving for
something beyond his ability to understand.383
Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice Gray did not engage the
parties' policy arguments, and ruled for Wilkins on the legal ones. The
opinion declared that there were only two categories of U.S. citizens,
those by birth and those by naturalization, and naturalization could not
occur without federal action. 384 Indians born "members of, and owing
immediate allegiance to, one of the Indian tribes,... although in a
geographical sense born in the United States," were in the same position
as children born in foreign countries, or those born in the United States
to "ambassadors or other public ministers of foreign nations."385 The
Court agreed that non-tribal Indians were born citizens of the United
States, such as those from the "remnants of tribes" in New York and
Massachusetts which had no federal recognition,386 and cited
approvingly an 1876 case holding an Indian born to a group that had
"ceased to exist as a tribe" was a citizen entitled to vote.387 Indians, Gray
wrote, could also naturalize under federal law.388 But absent federal
action, an Indian born in tribal relations could not become a citizen
simply by living apart from his tribe.
Justice Harlan, as was his wont, dissented. Joined by Justice Woods,
he asserted that any Indian who "in good faith" severed tribal relations
and "fully and completely surrendered" to the jurisdiction of the United
States became by that action a citizen.39 If this was not true, moreover,
the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment "wholly failed.., in respect
379 Id. at 16.
380 Id. at 17-18.
381 Id.
382 Id. at 18.
383 Id.
384 Elk, 112 U.S. at 101-02.
385 Id. at 102.
386 Id. at 107-08.
387 Id. at 107 (citing United States v. Elm, 25 F. Cas. 1006 (N.D.N.Y. 1877)).
388 Id. at 103.
389 Id. at 110, 118 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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of the Indian race," and there was "still in this country a despised and
rejected class of persons with no nationality whatever" subject to "all the
burdens of government" and yet not "entitled to any of the rights,
privileges, or immunities of citizens of the United States."390
Harlan was wrong that exclusion from birthright citizenship meant
that the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment had failed with respect
to Indians. In the 1860s, the most stalwart advocates of Reconstruction's
ideals had rejected broad extensions of Indian citizenship in the name of
tribal rights. Now, however, Harlan and Elk's lawyers cloaked Indian
citizenship in the ideals of Reconstruction, while Lambertson relied on
racism to argue against it. In part this reflected the changing status of
Indians and tribes: Increasingly controlled by agents on reservations
and surrounded by white settlers, U.S. citizenship seemed the only
remaining path for Indian equality. But it also reflected the ways the
terms of the debate had shifted, so that even the designated advocates
for the Indians were no longer willing to champion tribal autonomy.
2. Aftermath I: Coercion in the Name of Citizenship
The reformers' defeat in Elk v. Wilkins catalyzed legislative
action. 391 In 1885, Senator Dawes proposed a bill to reverse the result in
Elk.392 That bill did not pass, but Dawes' 1886 proposal to allot Indian
lands individually provided that any Indian born in the United States
"to whom allotments shall have been made," or "who has voluntarily
taken up ... his residence separate and apart from any tribe of
Indians .... and has adopted the habits of civilized life" was a citizen of
the United States.393 Earlier citizenship and allotment proposals had
required the consent of the tribe or individual Indians affected, but the
Dawes Act thrust both on Indians and tribes involuntarily.394 And
390 Id. at 122-23.
391 See FREDERICK E. HOXIE, A FINAL PROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN TO ASSIMILATE THE INDIANS,
1880-1920, at 75 (Bison Books 2001) (1984) (arguing that reformers believed the decision made
gradual assimilation no longer an option); Carol Nackenoff, Constitutionalizing Terms of
Inclusion: Friends of the Indian and Citizenship for Native Americans, 1880s-1930s, in THE
SUPREME COURT & AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 366, 380 (Ronald Kahn & Ken I.
Kersch eds., 2006).
392 1885 COMMISSIONER INDIAN AFF. ANN. REP. 7-8.
393 17 CONG. REC. 1632 (1886) (statement of the Chief Clerk).
394 Id. at 1631 (striking the provision regarding consent); FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA,
AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN CRISIS: CHRISTIAN REFORMERS AND THE INDIAN, 1865-1900, at
242-43, 252 (1976) [hereinafter PRUCHA, CHRISTIAN REFORMERS] (discussing proposals that
two-thirds of tribe consent to allotment).
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unlike allotment bills proposed since 1879, 395 this one passed, becoming
the infamous Dawes Allotment Act of 1887.396
The problem at this point was not citizenship itself. With tribal
sovereignty ignored and Indians forced into non-Indian society,
citizenship was a necessary if inadequate protection. But citizenship
became the rallying cry for everything done for-or more accurately
done to-Native people. Secretary of the Interior Carl Schurz wrote in
1881 that "[t]o fit the Indians for their ultimate absorption in the great
body of American citizenship" three things were necessary: that Indians
"be taught to -work"; that their youth be educated; and that "they be
individualized in the possession of property by settlement in severalty
with a fee simple title."397 The late nineteenth century policies now
almost synonymous with the federal abuses of Indians-allotment,
boarding schools, extension of state law-were all intended to ensure
that the Indian "individual is separated from the mass" and "made a
citizen."398
Allotment in particular was central to the reformers' "obsession"
with individualizing Indians and fitting them for citizenship.399 The
Board of Indian Commissioners asserted that allotment would break up
the Indian "communistic system" providing the "incentive to labor and
enterprise that the right to individual ownership of property inspires."400
Senator Dawes declared it would teach the Indians "selfishness, which is
at the bottom of civilization,"401 "wipe out the disgrace of our past
treatment" of the Indian, and "lift him up into citizenship and
manhood."402 Secretary of the Interior L.Q.C. Lamar even called the
1887 Allotment Act "a general naturalization law for the American
Indians."403
While rhapsodizing about Indian citizenship, .the reformers
ignored a key aspect of that status-political self-governance. Initial
allotment proposals required two-thirds of the male adult Indians in a
tribe to consent to allotment; the consent requirements were stripped
395 PRUCHA, CHRISTIAN REFORMERS, supra note 394, at 241-42.
396 Dawes Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388.
397 Carl Schurz, Present Aspects of the Indian Problem, in AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN
INDIANS, supra note 21, at 13, 17.
398 PRUCHA, CHRISTIAN REFORMERS, supra note 394, at 250.
399 Id. at 232.
400 Id. at 244 (quoting REPORT OF THE 13D. OF INDIAN COMM'RS 10 (1880)).
401 D.S. OTIS, THE DAWES ACT AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS 11 (Francis Paul
Prucha ed., 1973).
402 Henry L. Dawes, Solving the Indian Problem, in AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN
INDIANS, supra note 21, at 27, 30; see also PRUCHA, CHRISTIAN REFORMERS, supra note 394, at
237-38 (Sen. Richard Coke on allotment and citizenship); id. at 241-42 (Commissioner of
Indian Affairs E.A. Hayt on allotment and citizenship).
403 PRUCHA, CHRISTIAN REFORMERS, supra note 394, at 256.
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from the final bill.404 The "Five Civilized Tribes," the Cherokee,
Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek, and Seminole-widely described as those
most suited for American citizenship-consistently opposed any
allotment program. 405 The chiefs of the Kiowa and Caddo Nations
defied the efforts of the federal agent to travel to Washington, D.C., to
protest against the Dawes Act, but Congress had already voted by the
time they arrived.406 An aging Ely Parker now called "compulsory
allotment of lands and enforced citizenship". "certain death to the poor
Indians," declaring Indians "as a body... deadly opposed to the
scheme."407
The reformers did not even agree that citizen allottees should have
the right to vote. Former Supreme Court Justice William Strong
declared himself in favor of citizenship for allottees but not suffrage for
all Indian citizens,408 while Harvard Law professor James Thayer
declared it "inexcusable to force such a body of voters suddenly upon
the States where they live."4o9
Thayer's solution for making Indians into good citizens was to
subject them to American law.410 Other reformers agreed. For
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Merrill Gates, "the rule of law" (which
tribes allegedly lacked) was "essential" for making an Indian into an
"intelligent, useful citizen."411 The "white man's law" was a key aspect of
citizenship for Carl Schurz as well.412 The Allotment Act provided that
all allotments would be subject to state probate law and that the Indians
made citizens under the act would "be subject to the laws, both civil and
criminal, of the State or Territory in which they may reside."413 The
1906 Burke Act provided that once Indians held their allotments in fee
they would also be subject to state property taxes. 414 Similar
assimilationist arguments also contributed to the passage of the Major
Crimes Act in 1885, subjecting felonies between Indians to federal
jurisdiction.415
404 Id. at 243, 252.
405 Id. at 256.
406 Estin, supra note 183, at 216.
407 Ely S. Parker, Letter to Harriet Maxwell Converse, in AMERICAN INDIAN NONFICTION,
supra note 159, at 268.
408 Nackenoff, supra note 391, at 380.
409 James B. Thayer, A People Without Law, in AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS,
supra note 21, at 175, 181.
410 Id. at 182.
411 Merrill E. Gates, Land and Law as Agents in Educating Indians, in AMERICANIZING THE
AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 21, at 45, 55.
412 1885 COMMISSIONER INDIAN AFF. ANN. REP. 8.
413 Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, §§ 5-6, 24 Stat. 388, 389-90.
414 Burke Act, ch. 2348, § 6, 34 Stat. 182 (1906) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 349 (2012)).
415 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012); Harring, supra note 182, at 223-33 (discussing debate on the
Act).
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Boarding schools were another key plank of the citizenship
campaign. Richard Pratt, founder of the policy, declared that they would
"lift the Indian tribes into civilization and citizenship."416 Senator Dawes
said the boarding schools used Indian children as "the raw material out
of which shall come by this treatment a citizen of the United States," 417
while Commissioner Thomas Morgan described them as "that
comprehensive system of training and instruction which will convert
them into American citizens."418 The infamous practice of punishing
pupils for speaking their native languages was a direct outgrowth of
education for citizenship, with schools ordered to ensure children spoke
"the language of the Republic of which they are to become citizens."419
Citizenship was thus at the center of federal policies of Indian
assimilation and transformation. The Department of Interior's
citizenship ceremony, developed in 1916, symbolized this
transformation. Federal officials were instructed to construct an
artificial teepee, from which the candidates for citizenship would
emerge.4 20 If the candidate was male, the official would hand him a bow
and arrow and direct him to shoot, then address him in his "Indian
name": "You have shot your last arrow. That means that you are no
longer to live the life of an Indian. You are from this day forward to live
the life of the white man."421 Then, addressing the candidate in his
"white name," the official directed him to place his hands on a plow,
saying, "This act means that you have chosen to live the life of the white
man-and the white man lives by work."422 If the candidate was a
woman, the official handed her a work bag and purse and told her, "This
means that you have chosen the life of the white woman-and the white
woman loves her home.... Upon the character and industry of the
mother and home maker largely depends the future of our Nation."423
416 PRUCHA, CHRISTIAN REFORMERS, supra note 394, at 281 (quoting Everett Arthur
Gilcreast, Richard Henry Pratt and American Indian Policy, 1877-1906: A Study of the
Assimilation Movement 305-06 (1967) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Yale University)). The
Indian Rights Association agreed that Pratt's "goal is American citizenship," and he "flings
himself at it with all the force and combativeness of his vigorous nature." Id. at 276 (quoting
Elaine Goodale in INDIAN RIGHTS ASS'N, CAPTAIN PRATT AND HIS WORK FOR INDIAN
EDUCATION 6 (1886)).
417 15 CONG. REC. 4070 (1884) (statement of Sen. Dawes).
418 Thomas J. Morgan, Supplemental Report on Indian Education, in AMERICANIZING THE
AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 21, at 221, 222.
419 J.D.C. Atkins, The English Language in Indian Schools, in AMERICANIZING THE
AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 21, at 197, 203.
420 JANET A. MCDONNELL, THE DISPOSSESSION OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN: 1887-1934, at 95-
96 (1991).
421 U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Ritual on Admission of Indians to Full American Citizenship
(1918) (on file with North Dakota Historical Society, Major James McLaughlin Papers).
422 Id.
423 Id.
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The aftermath of these policies is well known. The Supreme Court
has declared the allotment policy "disastrous."424 Within a few decades,
the Indian land base had been reduced by two-thirds and reservations
were transformed into ungovernable checkerboards of Indian and non-
Indian land.425 Application of state intestacy laws to Indians, who rarely
wrote wills, soon made land unusable, because rights to a single parcel
were divided among hundreds, even thousands, of heirs,426 while state
property tax laws only exacerbated land loss.427 The 1928 Meriam
Report declared that the boarding school system "largely disintegrates
the family" and that provisions for the care of the children there were
"grossly inadequate."428 More recent reports are even more critical.429
As more and more Indians became citizens, fewer and fewer
benefits were attached to citizenship.430 The Supreme Court initially
suggested that Indian citizenship limited federal authority,431 but
quickly ate away this precedent, reversing it in 1911.432 The justification
for federal power, however, shifted from reliance on tribal political
status and diplomatic relationships with them to assertions of Indian
inferiority and dependence.433 And although the Elk Court stated that
citizen Indians should be able to vote, states rapidly found new ways to
avoid enfranchisement: some by declaring that the federal relationship
made Indians incompetent wards; others relying on Indian exemption
from state taxes; and others by deciding that those living on reservations
were not residents of the state.434 These restrictions continued until the
1950s in several states. 435
424 Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 707 (1987).
425 ROBERT T. ANDERSON, BETHANY BERGER, PHILIP P. FRICKEY & SARAH KRAKOFF,
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 108-12 (2d ed. 2010).
426 Id. at 110.
427 Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 12 (1995).
428 LEWIS MERIAM ET AL., INST. GOV'T RESEARCH, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN
ADMINISTRATION 15, 11 (1928) (prepared at the request of Hubert Work, Secretary of the
Interior).
429 See, e.g., SPEC. SUBCOMM. ON INDIAN EDUC., S. COMM. ON LABOR & PUB. WELFARE,
INDIAN EDUCATION: A NATIONAL TRAGEDY-A NATIONAL CHALLENGE, S. REP. NO. 91-501, at
XI (1969).
430 HOXIE, supra note 391, at 213-31.
431 See In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 509 (1905), overruled by United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591,
601 (1916). Congress reacted to Heff by passing the Burke Act, which delayed citizenship for
allottees until their allotments were patented in fee. Burke Act, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182 (1906)
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 349 (2012)).
432 Tiger v. W. Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286, 315 (1911).
433 HOXIE, supra note 391, at 230; see, e.g., United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 39 (1913)
(justifying federal authority over Pueblos despite their citizenship because they were "a simple,
uninformed, and inferior people").
434 HOxiE, supra note 391, at 231-34.
435 Bethany R. Berger, Red: Racism and the American Indian, 56 UCLA L. REV. 591, 645-46
(2009) (discussing restrictions in Arizona, New Mexico, South Dakota, Idaho, Utah, and
Minnesota).
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The legacies of Indian incorporation also played a role in the
emergence of the United States as an imperial nation. 1890, the year of
the massacre at Wounded Knee, was considered the closing of the
American frontier, and the United States soon turned its expansionist
attention abroad. Between 1898 and 1905, the United States asserted
colonial authority over Hawaii, Cuba (briefly, except for Guantanamo),
Puerto Rico, Guam, the Philippines, the Panama Canal, and Samoa.436
United States v. Wong Kim Ark was decided amidst this riot of
expansion, and whether it dictated citizenship for the racially suspect
inhabitants of the new territories was immediately a subject of
concern. 437 The Indian assimilation program, however, had produced
Supreme Court cases asserting vast power over Indian tribes
independent of tribal consent, treaty obligations, or constitutional
authority.438 Drawing on the unmoored power established in these
precedents and the Chinese Exclusion Cases,439 the United States
established federal authority over the insular territories not fully bound
by the Constitution, territories not destined to become states, subjects
without promise of citizenship, and citizens without full voting or other
rights.440
On June 2, 1924, President Coolidge signed the law establishing
birthright citizenship for American Indians.441 Neither Indians nor
Indian advocacy groups advocated for the Act. 442 A congressional report
noted that two-thirds of Indians were already citizens as a result of
allotment and other measures 443 and "Indians, as a whole, are not much
concerned about citizenship."444 The leaders of the Society of American
Indians, a group of western-educated Indian intellectuals,445 had begun
to reject citizenship as assimilation, emphasizing instead Indian
436 Cleveland, supra note 29, at 208.
437 See 32 CONG. REG. 574 (1899) (statement of Sen. Allen); American Citizenship,
LOUISVILLE COURIER J., July 10, 1898, at 20.
438 See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902) (upholding federal authority
to lease tribal property without tribal consent); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 376-78
(1886) (upholding federal authority to prosecute crimes between Indians); Ex parte Crow Dog,
109 U.S. 556, 569 (1883) (asserting that Indians were subject to U.S. regulation as "wards,
subject to a guardian").
439 See Cleveland, supra note 29, at 10-12 (linking cases regarding Indians and immigrants
to cases regarding insular territories).
440 Id. at 237-41; Sam Erman, Citizens of Empire: Puerto Rico, Status, and Constitutional
Change, 102 CAL. L. REv. 1181, 1187-88 (2014).
441 Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253.
442 Gary C. Stein, The Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, 47 N.M. HIST. REV. 257, 258 (1972).
443 JOSEPH E. OTIS, COMM. OF ONE HUNDRED APPOINTED BY THE SEC'Y OF THE INTERIOR,
THE INDIAN PROBLEM: RESOLUTION AND REVIEW, H.R. DOc. No. 68-149, at 6 (1924).
444 Id. at 40.
445 See MADDOX, supra note 153, at 10-11, 107-08; Bruyneel, supra note 140, at 33-35.
2016] 1241
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
tradition and culture.446 Other Indians were even less positive about the
Citizenship Act. Benjamin Caswell, president of a coalition of
Minnesota Chippewa tribes, believed citizenship would deprive them of
the right to meet as a political body; Wyandotte Jane Zane Gordon
wrote that Indians could not be forced to accept the dubious gift of
citizenship; and the nations of the Iroquois Confederacy sent the
president and Congress letters respectfully declining the citizenship
extended without their consent.447
Although organizations were stepping up advocacy for protection
of Indian religious, cultural, and property rights, citizenship was not
their focus.448 One non-Indian reformer, Herbert Spinden, even
borrowed from anti-immigrant rhetoric to declare that if given
citizenship, Indians "would form a dangerous mass of alien stock in our
political system."449 The Committee of One Hundred, a federal
commission of scholars, scientists, and leaders of Indian advocacy
organizations, had just submitted its report on Indian policy, but
rejected a resolution for immediate citizenship.45o Committee member
Arthur Parker, Ely Parker's nephew and former president of the Society
of American Indians, declared that the committee rejected the
resolution to "protect them from the rapacity of certain elements that
prey[ed] upon" them.451 The committee's main influence on the bill
appears to have been a provision to ensure that citizenship would not
affect Indian tribal or other property rights.452
A careful history speculates that the Indian Citizenship Act did not
reflect specifically Indian concerns, but was an effort of the dwindling
Progressive movement in Congress to remove the authority of the
notoriously inefficient Indian Bureau to grant or deny citizenship.453
446 Prominent SAI member Charles Eastman referred to the "savagery of civilization,"
rejected mandatory citizenship, and emphasized the superiority of traditional Native education
and religion over modern versions. MADDOX, supra note 153, at 131, 133, 137 (quoting
CHARLES A. EASTMAN, FROM THE DEEP WOODS TO CIVILIZATION: CHAPTERS IN THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF AN INDIAN 139 (Univ. of Neb. Press 1977) (1916)). Gertrude Bonnin
rejected the idea of the "whites as elevating the Indian," and wrote condemning boarding
schools and fought to preserve tribal culture and self-governance. Id. at 145-51 (quoting Letter
from Gertrude Bonnin, to Carlos Montezuma (June 1901)); see also Bruyneel, supra note 140, at
33 ("[Tlhe more active" pro-citizenship voices in the SAI "advocated a form of political
integration into the U.S. polity that subtly and carefully challenged the boundaries of American
citizenship.").
447 Bruyneel, supra note 140, at 136-38.
448 Stein, supra note 442, at 257-58, 261-62.
449 Id. at 262 (quoting Herbert J. Spinden, What About the Indian?, WORLD'S WORK, Feb.
1924, at 384).
450 Id. at 260-6 1.
451 Id. at 271 n.14 (quoting Arthur C. Parker, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1924,
at 8.).
452 Id. at 261.
453 Id. at 268.
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Given recent diminishment of the privileges associated with citizenship,
the Citizenship Act cannot be explained as a strong blow for Indian
equality. The bill's author, Representative Homer Snyder of New York,
assured the House that it was "not the intention of this law to have any
effect upon the suffrage qualifications in any State" or affect "tribal
relation[s] or any property" rights, but simply make the Indian "an
American citizen, subject to all restrictions to which any other
American citizen is subject, in any State."454 The law clearly did not
release Indians from federal domination. In fact, the 1924 Report of the
Board of Indian Commissions declared the Act "a challenge to the
Government to intensify its Indian Service activities."455
In 1933, Luther Standing Bear called the Indian Citizenship Act
"[t]he greatest hoax ever perpetrated" on the Indians, declaring that the
bill changed "not in the slightest measure the condition of the Indian.
Not one agent was removed from office... and the reservation and
reservation rule still exist."456 In the name of citizenship, Indians had
lost their land, their children, and their legal independence, and got
almost nothing in return.
3. Aftermath II: Citizen Elk?
John Elk seems to disappear from written records after 1884.457 He
may have changed his westernized name, 458 he may have died, or,
despite obsessive tracking of Indians in this period, he may simply have
been missed by census takers. Whatever the case, we cannot know the
aftermath for him. What we do know is what happened to the
Winnebago Tribe.
By 1890, almost all Winnebago reservation land was allotted.459
With little interest in participating in another federal experiment, most
Winnebago maintained their traditional villages until whites began
agitating for their allotted land.460 Responding to this pressure, Congress
454 65 CONG. REc. 9303 (1924) (statement of Rep. Snyder).
455 Stein, supra note 442, at 269 (quoting 1924 BOARD OF INDIAN COMMISSIONERS TO THE
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR ANN. REP. 2).
456 STANDING BEAR, supra note 1, at 229; MADDOX, supra note 153, at 155.
457 Records do repeatedly show a Sam Elk, who appears to have had a wife who died
sometime before 1890, but both his birth year (closer to 1855 than 1845) and birth location
(given as either Minnesota or Nebraska) are inconsistent with John's. The historians of the
Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska had no records of this notable ancestor. Conversation with
David Smith, Historian, Winnebago Tribe (May 5, 2013).
458 Such names were generally assumed to deal with non-Indians, and might be changed for
convenience. Id.
459 See Lurie, Cultural Change, supra note 235, at 177.
460 Id.
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authorized leasing of allotments, and by 1898, eighty percent of allotted
Winnebago land was leased to non-Indians.461 Federal agents
administered the lease proceeds; their approval was necessary before
Winnebago allottees could withdraw their own money.462 Then, after
Congress amended the Allotment Act to permit "competent" allottees to
sell their allotments,463 the Winnebago fell prey to land grabbers who
induced them to persuade agents to let them sell their lands for quick
cash.464 By 1914, non-Indians owned almost two-thirds of the
reservation.465 Dispossessed of land, their money controlled by federal
agents, and second-class citizens in the white-run towns now
dominating the reservation, Winnebago had high rates of alcoholism
and dissatisfaction; by the 1950s, many were leaving the reservation
altogether.466
A much-publicized case of the era reveals the barriers citizen
Winnebago still faced. Like many reservation Indians,467 Winnebago
Sergeant John Rice enlisted during World War II and received a Bronze
Star and Purple Heart for his service. 468 In 1945, he returned home and
married Evelyn, a white woman whose father owned a farm on the
Winnebago reservation.469 He re-upped to fight in Korea and was killed
leading his squad in combat in 1950.470 Because he was not white (or,
the courts reported, was eleven-sixteenths Winnebago and five-
sixteenths white), several cemeteries refused his wife's attempts to
purchase a burial plot for him, until she was finally able to obtain one in
Sioux City, Iowa. 471 After seeing Indians at Sergeant Rice's burial,
however, cemetery officials asked the undertaker about his race, and
then refused to allow his coffin to be lowered into the ground.472 The
cemetery's contract restricted burials to whites, and (the cemetery
declared in a pamphlet about the controversy) "Canadian archaeologists
461 PRUCHA, CHRISTIAN REFORMERS, supra note 394, at 260-62.
462 Lurie, Cultural Change, supra note 235, at 178.
463 Burke Act of 1906, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182, 183.
464 Id. at 178-79.
465 Id. at 180.
466 Id. at 182, 185, 217.
467 Although some Indians resisted induction and the imposed citizenship it implied,
noncitizen Indians had voluntarily enlisted in World War I in large numbers, and in World
War II voluntary enlistees had outnumbered inductees by two to one. ALISON R. BERNSTEIN,
AMERICAN INDIANS AND WORLD WAR II: TOWARD A NEW ERA IN INDIAN AFFAIRS 22-42
(1991).
468 Soldier's Burial, TIME, Sept. 10, 1951, at 28; John Raymond Rice, ARLINGTON NAT'L
CEMETERY, http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/jrrice.htm (last updated May 13, 2006).
469 David Hendee, Wife in Racial Flap at Cemetery Dies, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Jan. 28,
2005, at 2B, reprinted at John Raymond Rice, supra note 468.
470 John Raymond Rice, supra note 468.
471 Rice v. Sioux City Mem'l Park Cemetery, Inc., 60 N.W.2d 110, 112 (Iowa 1953).
472 Id. at 113.
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have reported definite proof that American Indians are descended from
Wild Mongolian Nomads that came to North America from Asia by
way of Alaska. In other words, the American Indian is not of Caucasian
descent."473 The Iowa Supreme Court rejected Evelyn's claims that the
cemetery violated the Fourteenth Amendment,474 and the U.S. Supreme
Court, burned from the backlash against Brown v. Board of Education,47s
twice agreed to hear the case then twice found a way not to rule on it.476
President Truman publicly condemned the Iowa cemetery and offered
Arlington Cemetery instead; Rice was buried there with military honors
in 1951.477
While Rice's case was pending, Nebraska became one of several
states to obtain jurisdiction over Indians on reservations under Public
Law 280.478 The law further undermined the already-declining
Winnebago tribal government. 479 It was not individual assimilation but
tribal group action that turned the decline around. The work of Henry
Roe Cloud, a Winnebago man born in the early years of allotment, may
even have contributed to this policy shift. Initially a passionate advocate
of assimilation and Christianization for Indians, Cloud later served as
the only Indian contributor to the 1928 Meriam Report, which
influentially condemned assimilation policy and redefined Indian
citizenship to mean active participation in one's own community.480 In
the 1930s, Cloud was a tireless advocate for the Indian Reorganization
Act, which sought to enhance tribal self-government, and as
superintendent of Haskell Indian Institute, he advocated preservation of
"Indian race culture."481
The 1930s encouragement of tribal self-government quickly gave
way to a policy of terminating the special Indian rights in the name of
granting Indians "all of the rights and prerogatives pertaining to
American citizenship."42 In the 1970s, however, when federal policy
473 Id. (quoting the pamphlet).
474 Id. at 116.
475 STEPHEN L. WASBY ET AL., DESEGREGATION FROM BROWN TO ALEXANDER: AN
EXPLORATION OF SUPREME COURT STRATEGIES 137 (1977) (arguing that the Court declined to
rule on the case to avoid generating further unpopular desegregation decisions).
476 Rice v. Sioux City Mem'l Park Cemetery, Inc., 349 U.S. 70 (1955) (dismissing certiorari as
improvidently granted); Rice v. Sioux City Mem'l Park Cemetery, Inc., 348 U.S. 880 (1954) (per
curiam) (affirming without opinion because Court was evenly divided).
477 Indian Hero Is Buried in Arlington Cemetery After Being Refused Interment in Sioux City,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1951, at 3.
478 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2012).
479 Milo Colton, Self-Determination and the American Indian: A Case Study, 4 SCHOLAR: ST.
MARY'S L. REV. ON RACE & SOC. JUST. 1, 2-3, 24 (2001).
480 JOEL PFISTER, THE YALE INDIAN: THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ROE CLOUD 139 (2009).
481 DAVID W. MESSER, HENRY ROE CLOUD: A BIOGRAPHY 109-11 (2010) (quoting Henry
Roe Cloud, Haskell and Her New Frontiers, INDIAN LEADER, June 1932).
482 Indians, H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83rd Cong., 67 Stat. B132 (1953).
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shifted back toward tribal self-determination, ideas like those espoused
by Cloud helped lay the groundwork for Winnebago transformation.
Since the 1980s, the Winnebago have won back jurisdiction over their
reservation, established tribal health and welfare programs, and cut
tribal unemployment by two-thirds through their economic
development corporation Ho-Chunk, Inc.483 Like tribes across the
nation, the Winnebago now have citizenship in the sense of autonomy
and self-governance, but they gained it by working through their tribe,
not by abandoning it.
B. United States v. Wong Kim Ark
1. Litigation
On October 2, 1895, with Wong Kim Ark still isolated on a
steamship in the San Francisco harbor, prominent San Francisco
attorney Joseph Napthaly filed a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of
Wong's friend Hoo Lung Sooey.484 On November 11, 1895, Thomas
Riordan joined Napthaly to file a more complete petition with Wong's
verification.4s On January 3, 1896, district court Judge William Morrow
opined that having citizenship follow that of one's parents was
"undoubtedly more logical, reasonable, and satisfactory," but the law of
the circuit required him to uphold birthright citizenship.486 He declared
Wong a citizen and ordered him released upon payment of a $250
bond.487
Deluged with letters from San Francisco lawyer George Collins, for
whom the case against Chinese birthright citizenship was a "special
hobby,"488 the U.S. Attorney General decided to use Wong's case to test
the issue before the Supreme Court.489 Solicitor General Holmes Conrad
filed a rambling opening brief, much of it showing, Conrad admitted,
that "the opinions of the Attorneys-General, the decisions of the Federal
and State courts, and, up to 1885, the rulings of the State Department all
concurred in the view that birth in the United States conferred
483 Colton, supra note 479, at 33-35.
484 Wong Record, supra note 310, at 2-3.
485 Id. at 5-9.
486 In re Wong Kim Ark, 71 F. 382, 392 (N.D. Cal. 1896).
487 Wong Record, supra note 310, at 23-24.
488 Salyer, Wong Kim Ark, supra note 30, at 65 (quoting Letter from Henry S. Foote, U.S.
Attorney, to Holmes Conrad (Nov. 6, 1895)).
489 Chinese as Citizens, S.F. CALL, Jan. 4, 1896, at 5. The issue had reached the Supreme
Court once before, but the Court found the petitioner was not in fact born in the United States.
Quock Ting v. United States, 140 U.S. 217 (1891).
1246 [Vol. 37:1185
BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP ON TRIAL
citizenship."490 To counter this broad consensus, Conrad made several
disjointed assertions: (1) there was no national common law or national
citizenship, only derivative state citizenship;491 (2) Roman/international
law followed the principle of citizenship by descent;492 (3) the
Fourteenth Amendment phrase "subject to the jurisdiction"
incorporated the international law definition and Wong's citizenship,
under international law, followed that of his parents; 493 and (4) the
exclusion laws showed that the United States did not want Chinese to be
citizens anyway.494
The arguments hung together so poorly as to suggest that the real
target for Conrad-a proud Virginian and veteran of the Confederate
army-was Reconstruction and the shift in federal power it created. The
Fourteenth Amendment, the brief asserted, was of "doubtful validity"
because of the coercion of ten southern states into ratification.495 Even
"if ever lawfully adopted," the brief argued, both national citizenship
and the Fourteenth Amendment were products of the "corrupt
ignorance and debauched patriotism" that led to a "'reconstruction' of
States which had contributed largely to the construction of the United
States."496
George Collins filed a second brief for the United States in an "of
counsel" capacity.497 His brief was more coherent than Conrad's, if no
less radical. He argued that although it was "generally... [accepted] that
a person born within the United States is ipso facto a citizen," this was a
mere "traditionary dogma" based on "ignorance."498 The rule of jus soli,
Collins insisted, was "peculiarly feudal and monarchical, and therefore
foreign to republican institutions."499 "Clearly," he wrote (in a use of the
term legal writing professors would condemn) the Roman principle of
citizenship by descent "must be the correct one, and it is now the
prevailing law."500 (Collins seems not to have been struck by the
feudalism of the rule he advocated, which determined a child's status
according to the status of her father, if legitimate, her mother, if not, and
of the state, if a "[f]oundling."501) The founders allegedly adopted the
490 Brief for the United States at 28, United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898)
(No. 132).
491 Id. at 8-9, 11-19.
492 Id. at 9-11.
493 Id. at 39, 43, 48-5 1.
494 Id. at 42, 45.
495 Id. at 46; see also Maj. Homes Conrad, 24 CONFEDERATE VETERAN, 1916, at 30.
496 Brief for the United States at 37, 16-17, Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (No. 132).
497 Brief on Behalf of the Appellant at 1, 39, Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (No. 132).
498 ld. at 1-3, 33.
499 Id. at 6.
500 Id. at 7.
501 Id. (quoting BAR ON INT'L LAW § 31).
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Roman principle by establishing the nation for "[w]e the people,"
including "ourselves and our posterity,"52 as did the Fourteenth
Amendment through the term "subject to the jurisdiction."03 The brief
bolstered its legal arguments with racism, declaring that the "offspring"
of Chinese subjects were "just as obnoxious" as their parents, and the
"honor and dignity in American citizenship" should be kept "sacred
from the foul and corrupting taint of a debasing alienage."504
Although Thomas Riordan filed a brief initial statement of the case,
the main briefs were by Maxwell Evarts and J. Hubley Ashton,505 leading
Supreme Court lawyers -whom the Six Companies had previously
secured to challenge the Geary Act in the Supreme Court. 506 Their briefs
expressed disbelief that the United States would cede the question of
citizenship to international law, and noted that the so-called
international law rule was actually not followed by many European
nations.07 The rule in the United States-established by common law
before 1866 and statutory and constitutional law thereafter-was that
those born in the United States were its citizens, regardless of the
citizenship of their parentssos Although Conrad and Collins relied on
Elk v. Wilkins to argue that "subject to the jurisdiction" meant full
political allegiance, Evarts and Ashton argued that Elk reflected the
distinct status of Indian tribes as independent political communities on
U.S. soil; no foreign country, however, was authorized to "establish
within our borders an independent political community."509 Ashton's
brief also set forth the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Reconstruction Congress' agreement on birthright citizenship
of children of Chinese immigrants. 510
In 1898, the Court ruled for Wong. Justice Horace Gray's majority
opinion catalogued the voluminous legal evidence for the rule of
birthright citizenship before, during, and after Reconstruction.
Birthright citizenship was an "ancient and fundamental rule."511 The
Fourteenth Amendment affirmed this rule "in clear words and in
502 Id. at 15 (quoting U.S. CONST. pmbl.).
503 Id. at 27 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV).
504 Id. at 34.
505 Statement of the Case for Appellee, Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (No. 132); Brief of the
Appellee, Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 [hereinafter Evarts Brief]; Brief for the Appellee, Wong
Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 [hereinafter Ashton Brief]. "Evarts Brief' refers to the brief submitted in
the 1895 term and signed by Maxwell Evarts, while "Ashton Brief' refers to the brief signed by
J. Hubley Ashton and submitted in the 1896 term.
506 SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS, supra note 276, at 47.
507 Evarts Brief, supra note 505, at 10, 13-14, 46.
508 Id. at 6.
509 Id. at 15, 27 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV).
510 Ashton Brief, supra note 505, at 19-34.
511 Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 693.
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manifest intent," including as citizens "children born within the
territory of the United States of all other persons, of whatever race or
color, domiciled within the United States."512 The limited exceptions
were for "children of foreign sovereigns or their ministers, or born on
foreign public ships, or of enemies within and during a hostile
occupation of part of our territory, and.., children of members of the
Indian tribes owing direct allegiance to their several tribes."513
The dissent followed the arguments of the solicitor general. The
United States had adopted and the Fourteenth Amendment reflected the
Roman law rule of citizenship based on descent. Justice Fuller wrote the
dissent, and Justice Harlan joined him, revealing again the gap in his
racial egalitarianism when it came to the Chinese.514
The majority also noted that rejecting birthright citizenship for
children of noncitizens would "deny citizenship to thousands of persons
of English, Scotch, Irish, German, or other European parentage, who
have always been considered and treated as citizens of the United
States." '1 The Court underestimated the numbers: fifteen million white
native-born United States residents-almost a quarter of the white
native-born population-had foreign-born parents.5 16 Political parties
actively courted the support of this group, and the government delayed
oral arguments in Wong Kim Ark until after the 1896 election.517
Interest convergence, therefore, surely aided Wong's victory.
2. Aftermath I: Exclusion's Spread
Although the interests of white immigrant groups contributed to
the result in Wong, the tactics and arguments originating with Chinese
exclusion were soon redeployed against all new migrants.58 Pressure
from the many voting citizens with immigrant origins and the business
interests still clamoring for new workers delayed the legal influence of
the nativists.519 But by the 1920s, American traditions of inclusion were
transformed in pursuit of the goal, in the words of one Immigration
512 Id.
513 Id.
514 Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L. REv.
151, 156 (1996) (arguing that Justice Harlan "was a faithful opponent of the constitutional
rights of Chinese for much of his career on the Court").
515 Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 694. Justice Field made the same point in the 1884 Look Tin
Sing arguments. See Look Tin Sing: An Important Case Argued in the Circuit Court Yesterday,
DAILY ALTA CAL., Sept. 28, 1884.
516 1900 CENSUS, supra note 49, at vol. 1, cxxxiii.
517 SALYER, Wong Kim Ark, supra note 30, at 51, 69-70.
518 See generally HIGHAM, supra note 121.
519 Id.
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Commissioner, of drawing "the meshes of the sieve ... closer and
tighter" to "invite into our house virile men, strong men," but "protect
ourselves" against the rest. 520
Between the 1890s and 1920s, Congress enacted laws excluding
those found to have a "loathsome" (code for sexually-transmitted) or
"dangerous contagious disease,"521 "epileptics," those convicted of
misdemeanors "involving moral turpitude," anarchists,522 those who
practiced or even believed in polygamy, those who were "mentally or
physically defective,"23 and those who possessed literature from
anarchist and other radical groups for distribution.24 Trapped between
the Scylla of protection of American jobs and the Charybdis of
protection of the public fisc, immigrants could be excluded both if they
were deemed "likely to become a public charge" and if they already had
a promise of employment in the United States.525 In 1929, entry without
authorization itself became a criminal offense.526
Although these laws were inspired in part by racialized fears of
white immigrants from eastern and southern Europe, particularly Jews
and Italians,527 blatantly racial bars increased as well. In 1902, Congress
made the Chinese exclusion laws permanent, and added Chinese
migrants from the new island territories-Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the
Philippines-to their scope. 28 The 1908 "Gentleman's Agreement"
excluded Japanese laborers,529 while a 1917 statute prohibited all
immigration from an "Asiatic barred zone," stretching from
Afghanistan to the Pacific, excluding only Japan and the Philippines,530
then a U.S. territory.
In 1924, the classification of immigrants by their racial and ethnic
desirability became complete. The 1924 Johnson Act limited
immigration from any country to two percent of the number from that
country present in the United States in 1890, before substantial
immigration from eastern and southern Europe (i.e., Italians and Jews)
520 SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS, supra note 276, at 227 (quoting Henry J. Skeffington,
Commissioner for Immigration, Remarks at the 1915 Immigration Consultation at San
Francisco 166-67 (Aug. 9-11, 1915)).
521 Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084.
522 Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 1012, § 2,32 Stat. 1213, 1214.
523 Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875.
524 Act of June 5, 1920, ch. 251, 41 Stat. 1008.
525 Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, §§ 1, 3, 26 Stat. 1084.
526 Act of Mar. 4, 1929, ch. 690, § 1, 45 Stat. 1551.
527 HIGHAM, supra note 121, at 160-75 (discussing racialized opposition to immigration
from Europe, particularly against Jews and Italians).
528 Act of Apr. 29, 1902, ch. 641, 32 Stat. 176.
529 TAKAKI, supra note 251, at 320.
530 Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874; see Immigration Act of 1921, ch. 8,
§ 2(a)(6), 42 Stat. 5 (referring to the prohibited region as "the so-called Asiatic barred zone").
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began.531 Descendants of slaves, American "aborigines," and immigrants
ineligible for citizenship were excluded entirely from quotas.532
Women too were targeted, to prevent Asians from forming families
in the United States, protect sexual morals from degrading foreign
influences, police relationships across national or racial lines, and codify
the conviction that a woman's economic and political identity was
derivative of her husband's.33 By 1917 one could be deported for
engaging in prostitution at any time after entry or committing a crime
of "moral turpitude" within five years after entry.5 34 Laws restricting
prostitutes and immigrants likely to become public charges were used to
exclude single women as well as Chinese and Japanese wives.535
Marriage could also lead to exclusion or inclusion. Between 1907 and
1922 any American woman marrying a foreigner lost her citizenship;536
even after that a woman could lose her citizenship for marrying a man
racially "ineligible to citizenship."537 Although the 1924 quota act freely
admitted white immigrant wives seeking to join their citizen
husbands,538 it completely barred Asian wives from joining theirs.539
Responding to Chinese success in using the rule of law to challenge
exclusions40 and the self-preservation narrative employed in the Chinese
exclusion cases, 541 rights associated with entry and deportation were also
transformed. In rules preserved in current statutes, 542 Congress deprived
courts of jurisdiction to review administrative decisions to exclude
immigrants at the border.543 Asserting that untrammeled federal power
to exclude and deport foreigners was "essential to self-preservation"544
531 Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 11, 43 Stat. 153, 159.
532 Id. § 11(d)(4).
533 See EITHNE LUIBHPID, ENTRY DENIED: CONTROLLING SEXUALITY AT THE BORDER 3-8
(2002); Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate Borders: lus Sanguinis Citizenship and the Legal
Construction of Family, Race, and Nation, 123 YALE L.J. 2134 (2014); Volpp, supra note 124, at
424-26.
534 Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889.
535 See LUIBHJ ID, supra note 533, at 9-11; see also LEE, AMERICA'S GATES, supra note 127, at
93-97; Tanaka Kei, Marriage as Citizen's Privilege: Japanese Picture Marriage and American
Social Justice, 31 NANZAN REV. AM. STUD. 131, 134-38 (2009).
536 Act of Sept. 22, 1922, ch. 411, § 4, 42 Stat. 1021, 1022.
537 Id. § 3.
538 Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 4, 43 Stat. 153, 155.
539 Chang Chan v. Nagle, 268 U.S. 346 (1925). In 1930, Congress relaxed the principle with
respect to pre-1924 marriages. Act of June 13, 1930, ch. 476, 46 Stat. 581.
540 SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS, supra note 276, at 26-29.
541 See Cleveland, supra note 29, at 127-45.
542 See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2012) (explaining that there is no administrative or
judicial review of decisions to deny entry); cf United States v. Barajas-Alvarado, 655 F.3d 1077
(9th Cir. 2011) (noting that this principle is only limited when the exclusion serves as the basis
for criminal prosecution).
543 Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, § 8, 26 Stat 1084; Act of Aug. 18, 1894, ch. 301, 28 Stat.
372, 390 ("Enforcement of the Chinese Exclusion Act").
544 Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892).
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the Supreme Court repeatedly upheld these laws against due process
challenges.545 Again invoking national self-preservation, the Court also
rejected First Amendment challenges to deportation for expressing
anarchist views,546 privileges and immunities challenges to the law
expatriating women who married noncitizens,547 and declared the right
to exclude immigrants based on race "no longer open to discussion."s48
Noncitizenship haunted immigrants legally within United States
borders as well. Although Chinese won numerous nineteenth-century
cases challenging state laws discriminating against noncitizen Chinese,
the Fourteenth Amendment offered only limited resistance to a new
wave of state laws preventing ownership, lease, or property ownership
by noncitizens who had not declared their intent to become citizens5 49
These laws targeted Japanese immigrants, who, in the wake of Chinese
exclusion, occupied the space Chinese had left both as an immigrant
labor force and as an unassimilable other.550 Although the Supreme
Court had held that a pro-labor statute requiring employers to have
eighty percent citizen employees was unconstitutional,55 the Court
upheld the alien land laws,552 overlooking their racially discriminatory
intent and finding that ownership and occupancy of land affected "the
safety and power of the state itself."553
As with Indians, the value of citizenship also decreased to protect
federal discretion. Lower courts initially held that those claiming U.S.
citizenship had to be granted judicial review of exclusion by
immigration officials at the border.554 In United States v. Ju Toy,55s the
district court found, after a trial of the evidence, that Ju Toy (like Wong,
a California-born cook) was a citizen born in the United States,
545 United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905); Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S.
538 (1895).
546 United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 290-92 (1904).
547 Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
548 Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86,97 (1903).
549 Although restrictions on property ownership by noncitizens had a long history in the
United States and some forms still continue, see Allison Brownell Tirres, Ownership Without
Citizenship: The Creation of Noncitizen Property Rights, 19 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1 (2013); Rose
Cuison Villazor, Rediscovering Oyama v. California: At the Intersection of Property, Race, and
Citizenship, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 979 (2010), these laws were both more encompassing,
preventing beneficial use as well as descent, and were distinctive in targeting racially-other
immigrants, see Keith Aoki, No Right to Own?: The Early Twentieth-Century "Alien Land Laws"
as a Prelude to Internment, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 37, 38-40 (1998).
550 Aoki, supra note 549, at 44-45.
551 Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
552 Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923); Terrace v.
Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 221 (1923); Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313 (1923).
553 Terrace, 263 U.S. at 221.
554 SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS, supra note 276, at 108-09.
555 198 U.S. 253, 253 (1905).
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reversing the customs collector's decision.556 The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that Ju Toy was not entitled to judicial review.
Dissenting, Justice Brewer called the examination by the collector a
"star-chamber proceeding of the most stringent sort."5s7 Regulations
dictated that Chinese seeking to enter the United States should be kept
from communicating with "any persons other than the officials under
[government] control," and "[examined] separate and apart from the
public, in the presence of... such witness or witnesses only as the
examining officer shall designate."558 Although those same regulations
provided that the exclusion acts did not apply to ethnic Chinese born in
the United States,559 the Court in Ju Toy in effect treated the applicant's
race and his citizenship as the same thing. The writ of habeas corpus-
that gift of the Reconstruction Congress to all seeking to vindicate
Reconstruction's ideals-could be denied to Chinese citizens stopped at
the border.
3. Aftermath II: Citizen Wong
In 1904, Wong Kim Ark traveled to China again. In his departure
photo, Wong looks confident, even happy.560 Although those claiming
to be native-born citizens were still being stopped at the border, and the
Supreme Court rejected Ju Toy's challenge to this exclusion that same
year,56' Wong (as his departure papers noted) had been certified a
citizen by the federal courts. 562 He could go back to see his parents, wife,
and children, and be confident of readmission.
Between 1910 and 1926, each of Wong's four sons would seek to
join him in America, under the rule that marital children of resident
U.S. citizens wherever born were eligible for citizenship.s63 Two were
initially rejected as fraudulent "paper sons"; one of these, already
confined at Angel Island for months, decided not to pursue an appeal,
but the second appealed and won. 564 At least one, Wong Yook Sue, was
556 Id. at 259; see also SALVER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS, supra note 276, at 111.
557 Ju Toy, 198 U.S. at 268 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
558 Id. at 266-67 (quoting certified questions from the Ninth Circuit).
559 Id. at 274.
560 Identification Photograph on Affidavit, NAT'L ARCHIVES CATALOG, https://
catalog.archives.gov/id/296479?q=*:* (last visited Feb. 14,2016).
561 Ju Toy, 198 U.S. at 263-64.
562 Identification Photograph on Affidavit, supra note 560.
563 Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, 10 Stat. 604.
564 See Testimony of Wong Kim Ark, supra note 331 (testifying that Wong Yook Sue had
been denied admission but was admitted on appeal); Letter from Luther C. Steward, Acting
Commissioner, Immigration Service, to Supervising Inspector, Immigration Service (Jan. 10,
1911) (on file with author) (noting that Wong Yoke Fun had returned to China on Jan. 9,
1911); Letter from O.P. Stiger, to Luther C. Steward, Acting Commissioner of Immigration,
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married when he made his initial journey, replicating his father's life
between two nations.565
These sons did not all stay in America, and could not always live
with Wong when they were there. When the youngest boy, Wong Yook
Jim made the trip in 1926, the oldest, Wong Yook Fun, was already back
in China helping the eleven-year-old begin his journey. The boy was
confined on Angel Island for weeks,66 and would have been isolated
from friends or family to prevent coaching by "wily Chinee."567 At Yook
Jim's hearing, Wong testified that his third son, Wong Yook Sue, lived
with him and worked as a pantry boy in a San Francisco hotel, while the
second, Wong Yook Thue, was working in railway camps in Arizona.568
He also testified that he had not had work as a cook for two months, and
that he had not been back to China since 1914, before Yook Jim was
born.569
Although Wong's citizenship created citizenship for his sons, he
probably never felt truly included in America. As one American-born
Chinese explained for a 1931 study, "We are American citizens in name
but not in fact."570 The 1890 and 1900 censuses did not even report the
number of native-born Chinese citizens, lumping them together with
other Chinese.57' Wong retired to China in the 1930s, at age sixty-two,
and never came back.572
Today, Chinese Americans have created central elements of
American culture, and like American Indians helped contribute to the
meaning of American citizenship itself. By 1966, Chinese were being
held up as a model minority, and this success was attributed to those
same factors-hard work, thrift, adherence to family and tradition-
once deemed to make them unassimilable.73 The Chinese-American
food developed by cooks like Wong is "arguably the most pervasive
cuisine on the planet"; there are more Chinese restaurants in the United
Angel Island Station (on file with author) (withdrawing appeal and noting that Wong Yoke Fun
had arrived on October 28, 1910).
565 List or Manifest of Alien Passengers on S.S. President Lincoln (June 18, 1924) (listing
Wong Yook Sue as married to Lee Shee from China on his arrival in the United States) (on file
with National Archives at San Francisco).
566 Action Sheet Arrival of Wong Yook Jim, U.S. Dept. of Labor (Aug. 3, 1926) (noting
arrival on June 30, 1926 and admission on July 24, 1926) (on file with National Archives at San
Francisco).
567 LEE, AMERICA'S GATES, supra note 127, at 126.
568 Testimony ofWong Kim Ark, supra note 331.
569 Id.
570 Lee, Wong Kim Ark, supra note 2, at 76.
571 CENSUS DIV., DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ABSTRACT OF THE ELEVENTH CENSUS: 1890, at 42
(2d ed. rev. & enlarged 1896), https://usa.ipums.org/usalresources/voliii/pubdocs/1890/1890b2-
01.pdf; 1900 CENSUS, supra note 49, at 492.
572 Lee, Wong Kim Ark, supra note 2, at 76.
573 Success Story of One Minority Group in U.S., U.S. NEWS &WORLD REP., Dec. 26, 1966.
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States than McDonald's, Burger King, and KFC restaurants
combined.574 San Francisco's Chinatown remains one of the largest in
the world, and is one of the city's top tourist destinations.75 751
Sacramento Street, where Wong Kim Ark was born, is now part of the
Nam Kue Chinese School, originally founded by the Fook Yum huiguan,
and still a place parents send their children to learn Chinese languages
and culture. 576
Only Wong's youngest son, however, made a permanent home in
the United States. Wong Yook Jim initially remained in San Francisco
only six months before homesickness drove him back to China to finish
high school.577 His father returned to China four years later, but after a
rare few months with him, Yook Jim returned to San Francisco,578
repeating his father's 1890 journey leaving his parents in China to find
work on his own. Arriving during the Depression, he traveled to
Minneapolis, Chicago, and Sacramento in search of work as a waiter.579
When World War II broke out, Yook Jim's derivative citizenship
subjected him to the draft; he was inducted into the army but
transferred to the Marines.580 Until then, he had corresponded regularly
with his father, but their letters did not get through during the war.58 '
Shortly after the war, village elders wrote to tell him his father had
died.582
During the Korean War, Yook Jim signed up with the Merchant
Marines.583 He remained with them for twenty-five years, traveling
across the world,584 but marrying and making his home near
Sacramento.85 Wong Kim Ark had never really spoken of his legal
battle, and Yook Jim had not realized its importance until he saw an
article on its hundredth anniversary in his local Chinese-language
newspaper.586 He suggested that his nineteen-year-old granddaughter
Alice Wong investigate the case records in the National Archives in San
574 JENNIFER 8. LEE, THE FORTUNE COOKIE CHRONICLES: ADVENTURES IN THE WORLD OF
CHINESE FOOD 9, 209 (2008).
575 PHILIP P. CHOY, SAN FRANCISCO CHINATOWN: A GUIDE TO ITS HISTORY AND
ARCHITECTURE 9 (2012).
576 LAI, supra note 254, at 282; Nam Kue Chinese School, S.F. CHINATOWN, http://
www.sanfranciscochinatown.com/attractions/namkue.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2016).
577 WONG, YELLOW JOURNALIST, supra note 331, at 52, 54.
578 Id.
579 Id.
580 Id. at 54-55.
581 Id. at 55.
582 Id.
583 Id.
584 Id.
585 Lisa Davis, The Progeny of Citizen Wong, S.F. WKLY. (Nov. 4, 1998), http://
www.sfweekly.com/1998-11-04/news/the-progeny-of-citizen-wong.
586 WONG, YELLOW JOURNALIST, supra note 331, at 52.
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Bruno. 587 Alice was treated like a celebrity by the archivists, but angered
by the story of discrimination she found in the files. 588 Later, Alice and
Yook Jim visited the former Angel Island detention center together; her
grandfather cried remembering the weeks he spent detained there as a
boy, alone, waiting to meet his father for the first time. 589
C. Conclusion
In the wake of Elk v. Wilkins, the United States involuntarily
extended citizenship to Indian allottees and took their land, children,
and independence to prepare them for it, while in the wake of United
States v. Wong Kim Ark, the United States doubled down on exclusion,
extending it past Chinese to classify all immigrants based on race,
national origin, and other characteristics deemed threatening to the
United States. The Indian Citizenship Act and the Johnson Immigration
Act were enacted within a week of each other in 1924. As with the
apparent contrast between Elk v. Wilkins and United States v. Wong Kim
Ark, the statutes are not as inconsistent as they appear,590 both
representing the power of the government to forcibly absorb the land
and sovereignty of those already here and regulate and exclude those
they did not want.
CONCLUSION
Citizenship is a powerful thing. At its best, it represents a
commitment to sharing governance, welfare, and belonging with all
members of a community. For John Elk and Wong Kim Ark, as for
many individuals, it likely represented access to the best things in life:
family, community, and freedom from governmental oppression. But
the stories of John Elk and Wong Kim Ark show the dark side of
citizenship. Constructing the community of citizens, we see, may erase
existing political, geographic, and familial communities and create
governmental authority to police and define both geographic and
ideological borders.
The legacies of these stories are very much with us today. Most
immediately, the distinction between Elk v. Wilkins and United States v.
Wong Kim Ark remains central for those insisting on constitutional
587 Davis, supra note 585.
588 Id.
589 Id.
590 See Joseph William Singer, The Stranger Who Resides with You: Ironies of Asian-
American and American Indian Legal History, 40 B.C. L. REv. 171,172-73 (1998).
2016] BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP ON TRIAL
authority to withhold citizenship from children of undocumented
immigrants. 591 As others have noted,592 the history makes clear that Elk
v. Wilkins was based on the unique constitutionally-recognized
autonomy of tribes even while on U.S. soil. This prevents its application
to non-tribal peoples, who have no such status. In addition, the 1898
acceptance of birthright citizenship for Wong at a time when Chinese
were wholly despised and excluded under U.S. policy inscribes the
fundamental constitutional value of jus soli for all, a value that has only
been reaffirmed in the failure of efforts to repeal it for the children of
undocumented immigrants.93
But the effects of this history are far more broad-reaching and
insidious. Nineteenth-century efforts to use private property to shape
Indians into individualistic citizens have left today's reservations
checkerboards of Indian and non-Indian land, much so divided it
cannot profitably be used, while boarding schools contributed to the
death of many tribal languages and lasting scars on Indian family life. 594
In the modern era, the fact of Indian citizenship has been used to argue
for state jurisdiction over Indian tribes,595 efforts to reduce tribal
jurisdiction over criminals in their territory,96 denial of off-reservation
fishing rights,97 and other incursions on tribal sovereignty.598
Recognizing that citizenship was not a gift to Native people, but part of
a campaign of forced assimilation, contributes to the moral imperative
to combine Indian citizenship with tribal self-determination. 599
591 See Eastman, supra note 37, at 961-95; Jan C. Ting, Illegal Immigration, Arizona, and the
Fourteenth Amendment: The Case for Limits and Enforcement, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 449, 460
(2011).
592 See, e.g., Gerard N. Magliocca, Indians and Invaders: The Citizenship Clause and Illegal
Aliens, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 499 (2008).
593 Smith, Birthright Citizenship, supra note 37, at 1334.
594 See ANDERSON, BERGER, FRicKEY & KRAKOFF, supra note 425, at 108-12.
595 Indians, supra note 482 (congressional resolution calling policy of terminating Indian
tribes and subjecting Indians to state law as giving them the "same privileges and
responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of the United States").
596 See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 212-13 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
judgment) (arguing that tribes cannot constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians within their borders).
597 See, e.g., Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n v. Tollefson, 571 P.2d
1373, 1376 (Wash. 1977) (en banc) (relying in part on citizenship of Indians and non-Indians
to find treaty rights unconstitutional), vacated sub nom. Washington v. Wash. State
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979), modified sub nom.
Washington v. United States, 444 U.S. 816 (1979).
598 Cohen v. Little Six, Inc., 543 N.W.2d 376, 382-408 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (Randall, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that citizenship of American Indians made tribal courts, sovereign
immunity, and sovereignty generally illegal).
599 See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. 23,396 (1970) (statement of President Richard M. Nixon, calling
forced termination of tribal status "no more appropriate than to terminate the citizenship rights
of any other American").
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Similarly, although Congress repealed Chinese exclusion laws in
1943,600 racial bars to naturalization in 1952,601 and racialized
immigration quotas in 1965,602 the period that began with Chinese
exclusion left behind a system that dubs millions of U.S. residents illegal
aliens and accords the government plenary power to regulate them.603
Immigration law, moreover, remains defiant to constitutional norms of
due process, free speech, and equal protection. 604 The coiner of the
phrase "manifest destiny" described America as a nation "from many
other nations... entirely based on the great principle of human
equality."605 As in Wong's time, we continue to assert these ideals in
order to justify departing from them.
Yet the stories of Elk and Wong and their communities also offer a
more positive legacy. Both decisions were results of egalitarian
traditions: for Wong Kim Ark, the commitment to inclusion of all those
born on United States soil, regardless of race or despised status; for Elk,
the legacy of a commitment to tribal sovereignty. Despite the violations
of these commitments in the nineteenth century and today, indigenous
people and immigrants were able to draw on these traditions to protect
their own families and distinctive communities. These communities and
their stories, too, are part of the American citizenship tradition.
600 Chinese Exclusion Repeal Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-199, 57 Stat. 600.
601 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
602 Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911.
603 See NGAI, supra note 18 (tracing creation of the illegal immigrant to the 1920s
legislation); SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS, supra note 276 (dating vast federal power over
immigration to Chinese exclusion); Judith Resnik, Bordering by Law: The Migration of Law,
Crimes, Sovereignty, and the Mail (Yale Law Sch. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 520, 2014),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2472101 (discussing modern immigration
regime).
604 See Cleveland, supra note 29, at 162; see also Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 533 U.S. 53, 56-57 (2001) (affirming sex discriminatory laws regarding parental
derivative citizenship); Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999)
(upholding lack ofjudicial review of deportation allegedly for unpopular views and religion).
605 O'Sullivan, supra note 20, at 426.
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